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Note
State Discretion in Funding Organ Transplants Under
the Medicaid Program: Interpretive Guidelines
in Determining the Scope of Mandated
Coverage
C. David Flower
In 1992, Sheri Dexter died while waiting for an allogenic
bone marrow transplant,' the only treatment that her physicians believed could prevent leukemia from killing her. Sheri
Dexter was waiting because she was in a court fight with the
state of Arizona, which did not cover allogenic bone marrow
transplants under her health care plan-the federal Medicaid
2
program.
In thirty years, the Medicaid program3 has become the second largest source of medical care in the United States, provid1. Allogenic bone marrow transplants involve the replacement of the patient's bone marrow with donor marrow harvested from another person. Allogenic marrow transplants replace the patient's cancerous bone marrow after
it has been destroyed by intensive chemotherapy. Dexter v. Kirschner, 972
F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir.), modified, 984 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 1115-16. For a critique of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dexter,
see Richard H. Gastineau, Case Brief, Dexter v. Kirschner: Arizona's Medicaid
Programand the FundamentalRight to Treatment, 2 J. PHARm. & L. 86 (1993).
3. Congress enacted Medicaid with the Social Security Amendments of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended as Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
Although Congress created the Medicare and Medicaid programs at the same
time, the two programs differ substantially. Medicare, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), functions essentially as a federal
health insurance program, with uniform eligibility requirements and coverage
provisions, centrally administered by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
Medicaid, on the other hand, functions as a joint federal-state welfare program.
See infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of the
Medicaid program); see also Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of JudicialReview
RegardingMedicareand MedicaidProgramPolicy: PastExperience and Future
Expectations, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 759, 761-62 (1991) (comparing the two
programs).
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ing services to more than thirty million people, 4 nearly half of
whom are children. 5 In a context of burgeoning health care
costs, 6 some balance must be struck between access to services
and states' need to determine priorities for Medicaid dollars. 7
4. HousE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW
OF ErrrnLEmrNT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN BOOK 798 (1994) [hereinafter GREEN
BOOK]. In 1992, approximately 11% of the population of the United States received some form of health care coverage through the Medicaid program. Id. at
788.
5.
SOURCE

CoNGREssioNAL RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAID
BooKm BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYsis (A 1993 UPDATE) 605 (1993)

[hereinafter

MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK].
In 1991, of Americans with incomes below the federal poverty level, more
than 47% received Medicaid. Approximately 13% of people living below the
poverty line received health insurance through the Medicare program, and approximately 13% had health care coverage either through employment or some
other source; more than 28% of the poor had no health care coverage at all.
After employment-based coverage and Medicare, Medicaid is the third largest
source of health care coverage in the United States. Id. at 47, 49. Given the
death of comprehensive health care reform legislation in the 103d Congress,
Medicaid is likely to remain the single largest source of health care for poor
Americans into the foreseeable future. Thus, questions of Medicaid cost allocation seem likely to continue. For discussions of the demise of health care reform
in 1994, see Monica Borkowski, The Health Care Debate: Chronology-High
Feverto No Pulse, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at B10; Health Reform-Deadfor
Now, N.Y. Thms, Sept. 27, 1994, at A24. On the other hand, Medicaid could
well be changed considerably, both structurally and in the extent of its coverage, given the Republican takeover of Congress in the 1994 elections and increasing calls for restructuring of public welfare programs. See Carl M.
Cannon, Congress Turns Debate to Welfare, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 15, 1995, at
1A; Peter G. Gosselin, Medicare, Medicaid Cuts Urged, BosToN GLOBE, Jan. 8,
1995, at 1; Robert Pear, Welfare Debate Will Re-examine Old Assumptions, N.Y.
TImEs, Jan. 2, 1995, at Al.
6. Per capita spending on health care increased from $211 per year in
1965 to $2511 per year in 1990. BARRY R. FuRRow Er AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS

661 (2d ed. 1991). The rate of inflation of health care

costs grew at twice the general inflation rate between 1980 and 1988. Id.
7. A spate of articles in this vein discuss the Oregon Medicaid "rationing"
program proposal initially rejected by the HCFA during the Bush administration, but subsequently approved during the Clinton administration. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Astrue, Pseudoscience and the Law: The Case of the Oregon Medicaid RationingExperiment, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 375 (1994) (criticizing the Oregon plan as an unscientific and unjustified rationing plan that uses abhorrent
"quality of life" assumptions); Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last:
The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1992) (criticizing the
Oregon plan's potential curtailment of services for poor women and children);
Robert L. Schwartz, Medicaid Reform Through Setting Health CarePriorities,
35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 837 (1991) (defending the Oregon plan as a reasonable
effort to provide basic medical care to the largest possible number of people).
The political, economic, and ethical issues involved in the allocation of limited public resources are beyond the scope of this Note, but see generally GutDo
CALABRESI & PmLIP BOBBrr, TRAGic CHOICES (1978). For a discussion of allocation issues in the area of organ transplantation, see H. Tristram Engelhardt,
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Although organ transplants are often the only hope for desperately ill people, they are also often risky, new, and enormously
expensive. 8 Tragedies such as Sheri Dexter's are perhaps the
starkest illustration of the "tragic choices" 9 that the federal and
state governments must make in allocating finite public resources for health care.
In recent years, the federal courts have struggled to define
the obligation of states to provide Medicaid funds for transplants. Two circuits have held that states have complete discretion in transplant funding decisions,1 0 while two other circuits
have held or suggested that the Medicaid statute requires states
to fund transplants for Medicaid recipients who need them."
This Note examines the difficulty in determining the scope of
mandated coverage under the Medicaid program, focusing on
the split among the circuits over the obligations of states to fund
organ transplant procedures. Part I describes the structure of
the Medicaid program and the services that it provides. Part II
describes judicial efforts to determine the obligations of states to
fund transplants. Part IH critiques these opinions and suggests
that, by and large, the courts have pursued the wrong interpretive questions. Part IV argues for a dynamic interpretive approach to Medicaid scope-of-coverage disputes that recognizes
the evolutive nature of medical technology in the context of the
multiple, changing, and sometimes contradictory goals and features of the Medicaid program. This Note concludes by suggesting a view of Medicaid coverage issues that not only protects
beneficiaries against arbitrary denial of service, but also realistiJr., Allocating Scarce Medical Resources and the Availability of Organ Trans-

plantation: Some Moral Presuppositions,in ORGAN SUBSTrrUToN TECHNOLOGY:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IssuEs 221, 222-24 (Deborah Mathieu ed.,

1988).
8. Transplant costs are difficult to estimate because patients often incur
long-term, post-surgery expenses and because post-surgery course of recovery is
unpredictable and varies from patient to patient. Mary Ann Baily, Economic
Issues in Organ Substitution Technology, in ORGAN SUBSTrrUTION TECHNOL
OGY: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC PoLicY IssuEs, supra note 7, at 198, 199-201.
Average costs can approach $50,000 for kidney transplants, $150,000 for heart
transplants, and more than $320,000 for liver transplants. Id. at 199.
9. CALABREsi & BOBBrr, supra note 7.
10. Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir.), modified, 984 F.2d
979 (9th Cir. 1992); Meusberger v. Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280, 1282 (8th Cir. 1990);
Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988).
11. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723,727 (4th Cir. 1993); Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 998 F.2d 887,
891 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
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cally reserves to states a large measure of administrative
discretion.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING OF THE
MEDICAID PROGRAM
Medicaid, contained in Title XIX of the Social Security Act,
is a cooperative program between the federal government and
the individual states. 2 The Medicaid program pays for certain
health care expenses for quahifing low-income or disabled persons. At the federal level, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the Department of Health and Human
Services administers the program.' 3 States may choose whether
to participate in the Medicaid program, although all states participate to some extent.14 To participate, states must develop
and HCFA must approve a "state plan" setting forth eligibility
and coverage criteria that are in accordance with the federal
statute. 15 Once HCFA approves16the state plan, the state must
abide by the terms of Title XIX.
Under Title XIX, the primary responsibilities of the federal
government are to set broad policy, ensure state compliance
with the statute, and provide federal funds to supplement state
spending on Medicaid. 17 Federal spending on Medicaid has in12. The courts have often referred to Medicaid, and other federal welfare
programs largely adminitered and implemented by states, as examples of "cooperative federalism." See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980);
Douglas v. Babcock, 990 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86
(1993); Washington Dep't of Social & Health Servs. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 549, 557
(9th Cir. 1987); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (using the term
"cooperative federalism" to describe the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program). The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
also participate in the Medicaid program. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 799800.
13. Id. at 790. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making
for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to Federalism,51 OMO ST. L.J. 855
(1990) (detailing the complex relationship between HCFA and the states).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988). Arizona has participated only since the early
1980s through a limited demonstration project. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at
783 & n.18; Kinney, supra note 13, at 860 n.38.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a), 1396a(b), 1396b(a) (1988).
16. Id. § 1396c; see alsoHarrisv. McRae, 448 U.S. at 301 ("Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the requirements of Title XIX."). Although HCFA
has the authority to terminate a state's participation in the Medicaid program if
the state fails substantially to comply with the statute or regulations, the
agency has never taken such action. FuRRow ET AL., supra note 6, at 596.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (1988). HCFA determines the federal matching
share of individual states' Medicaid expenditures under this section largely by
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creased nearly a hundredfold since 1966.18 State Medicaid
spending has increased even more sharply,1 9 and Medicaid costs
comprise an ever-increasing proportion of state budgets. 20
Although all states have experienced increased Medicaid costs,
state expenditures per recipient vary significantly. 2 1
A.

ELIGIBILIT

The eligibility provisions for Medicaid are exceedingly complex, and Congress has modified them frequently since the program's inception. 2 2 Title XIX establishes two basic eligibility
groups: the "categorically needy" and the "medically needy."
The categorically needy2 3 include persons receiving cash assistreference to states' per capita income; the federal match can range from 50% to
83%. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 789. In 1992, the federal match ranged
from 50% in 11 states (primarily on the coasts) to 79.99% in Mississippi. ADviSORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MEDICAID: INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRENDS AND OPTIONS 17 (Pub. No. A-119) (1992) [hereinafter MEDICAID

TRENDS AND OpnONsl.
18. In 1966, the federal government spent approximately $790 million on
Medicaid; HCFA projects federal costs of over $96 billion in 1995. GREEN Boox,
supra note 4, at 796-97.
19. In 1966, state Medicaid spending totaled less than $90 million. State
costs in 1995 will likely total more than $72 billion. Id.
20. Medicaid consumed less than 3% of state fixed-cost expenditures in
1966, but nearly 15% in 1990. MEDICAm TRENDS AND OPTIONS, supra note 17,
at 26.
21. MEDICAID SOURCE Boo, supra note 5, at 115-21; GREEN Boo, supra
note 4, at 811-12. In fiscal year 1992, state expenditures per recipient averaged
just under $3000; however, state spending per recipient ranged from $520 in
Arizona to nearly $6000 in New York. Id. at 811.
22. One commentator, describing the overwhelming complexity of the statute in general, has noted that the "Medicaid statute has been described as
'[blyzantine' (by Justice Powell), 'a morass of bureaucratic complexity' (by Chief
Justice Burger), 'almost unintelligible to the uninitiated' (by Judge Friendly),
'an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to attempts to understand it! and a 'Serbonian bog.'" Schwartz, supra note 7, at 837-38 (citations
omitted).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 C.F.R. § 435.4
(1993). The "categorically needy" eligibility group includes two subgroups. The
"mandatory categorically needy" subgroup includes recipients of AFDC or SSI
or individuals who meet other criteria specified by Title XIX; states must offer
Medicaid coverage to such individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1(b)(1), 435.100-.170 (1993). The Medicaid
program defines the "optionally categorically needy" subgroup by a number of
other criteria, but this eligibility group typically includes persons who are financially eligible for AFDC or SSI but are ineligible for other reasons; states
have discretion to offer or deny Medicaid coverage to these individuals. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1(b)(2),
435.200-.236 (1993). For example, under § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(III), states with
relatively restrictive criteria for AFDC eligibility may choose to offer Medicaid
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ance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)24 or Supplemental Security Income (SSI),25 as well as
persons who are blind or severely disabled. 2 6 In the 1980s, Congress amended the statute several times to expand "categorilow-income persons,
cally needy" eligibility to include additional
27
particularly women and children.
Title XIX grants states discretion to extend eligibility to persons who meet the "medically needy" eligibility criteria. 28 Generally, medically needy recipients have income and resources
that are too high to meet AFDC or SSI eligibility criteria, but
are insufficient to meet medical costs. 29 In most states, persons
become eligible as medically needy by "spending down," that is,
by reducing assets to eligibility levels by spending on medical
care.3 0 States have discretion to set their own criteria for the
coverage to individuals who do not meet state criteria for AFDC eligibility but
who would qualify if the state extended AFDC eligibility to the full extent allowed by federal law. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 784. Although such a state
does not have to provide Medicaid to such persons, if the state does so provide
services, it may not treat those persons differently with respect to coverage
than persons qualifying as "mandatory categorically needy." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(B) (1988); see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing
services that must be offered to all categorically needy recipients).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
25. Id. §§ 1381-1383d. Section 1396a(f) of Title X=X permits some states,
known as "section 209(b) states," to use more restrictive criteria for eligibility
than the SSI criteria. Twelve states currently have 209(b) status. GREEN
BOOK, supra note 4, at 785.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(q)(2) (1988). An applicant who is determined to be a
"qualified severely impaired individual" is eligible for Medicaid regardless of
income. An applicant qualifies under § 1396d(q)(2) if he or she is "blind or continues to have the disabling physical or mental impairment on the basis of
which he [or she] was found to be under a disability and, except for his [or her]
earnings, continues to meet all non-disability-related requirements for eligibility for benefits." Id. Medicaid thus constitutes a significant source of health
care for persons with disabilities. In fiscal year 1992, approximately 4.4 million
persons received Medicaid coverage on the basis of blindness or disability.
GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 800.
27. See MEDICAID SOuRcE BOOK, supra note 5, at 35-37; Kinney, supra note
13, at 866.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1(e)(3) (1993).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 435.4 (1993).
30. GREEN Boox, supra note 4, at 787; MEDICAID TRENDS AND OriONS,
supra note 17, at 11. Most Medicaid expenditures for the medically needy are
for long-term institutional care such as nursing homes. Id. ("As a practical
matter, the medically needy program is primarily a benefit for institutionalized
elderly and disabled persons.") (quoting CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
100TH CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICAID SOuRCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANAL-

Ysis 70 (1988)). Spending on the medically needy comprises a disproportionate
share of Medicaid expenditures. In fiscal year 1992, per capita spending for the
categorically needy totaled approximately $2500, but nearly $4800 for the med-
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medically needy, within statutory guidelines. 3 ' States have
complete freedom under the statute not to extend eligibility to
the medically needy at all, so long as they provide services to
those who qualify as categorically needy.3 2
Because states may set their own eligibility standards
under the AFDC program,3 3 the number and characteristics of
categorically needy Medicaid recipients vary widely among the
states. 3 4 The states also differ significantly in providing Medicaid to medically needy recipients, with some states offering relatively expansive eligibility criteria 3 5 and other states not
recognizing medically needy eligibility at all.3 6
B.

SERVICES MEDICAID PROVIDES

Title XIX not only describes the general criteria for Medicaid eligibility, but also describes services that the program may
provide. 37 The statute requires states to provide to all "categorically needy" persons several different types of medical services.3 s For the most part, the statute defines these mandatory
ically needy. GREEN Boox, supra note 4, at 803. The high cost of institutional
care causes this disparity: nursing home services (primarily used by the elderly
medically needy) averaged more than $12,000 per person in 1990. MEDICAID
TRENDs AND OrIONS, supra note 17, at 36. The most costly service, institutional care facilities for persons with mental retardation (ICF/MR), averaged
more than $50,000 per recipient in 1990; such facilities serve comparatively few
persons. Id.
31. 42 C.F.R. § 435.811 (1993). States typically tie criteria for eligibility as
medically needy to family income, which may not exceed 133a% of the state's
maximum payment under its AFDC program for a family of the same size. Id.
32. In 1993, 15 states did not extend coverage to any persons deemed "medically needy" (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming). GREEN BooK, supra note 4, at 787.
33. MEDICAID TRENDS AND OPTIONS, supra note 17, at 10.
34. MEDICAID SouRcE Booi, supra note 5, at 117. "Because states have
great flexibility in structuring eligibility, benefits, coverage, and payment policies, the Medicaid program is really 50 very different programs serving different populations and providing different benefits." Kinney, supra note 13, at
857.
35. MEDICAID SouRCE Boox, supra note 5, at 117-18.
36. See supra note 32 (listing states that do not extend eligibility to 'medically needy").
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(24) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A) (Supp. IV 1992) requires that state plans provide "for making medical assistance available, including at least the care and
services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5), (17) and (21)" of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a) to all "categorically needy" recipients. These sections make the following service categories mandatory for categorically needy recipients: inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, laboratory and X-ray
services, nursing home services for recipients over age 21, early and periodic
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services by general categories, such as "inpatient hospital services,"3 9 rather than by specific procedures. 40 Title XIX also describes a number of optional medical services that states may
choose to offer, if the state plan describes those services and if
they are4 1otherwise delivered in accordance with the terms of the
statute.
States have wide latitude to limit provision of Medicaid
services. At the broadest level, states have almost complete
freedom to design their own mix of optional services, or may
even choose to provide none of the optional services enumerated
in Title X=X.42 States may also choose to provide fewer optional
screening, diagnostic, and treatment services (EPSDT) for children under age
21, family planning services and supplies, physicians' services, nurse-midwife
services, and services provided by pediatric nurse practitioners and family
nurse practitioners. Id.
The early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment service category (EPSDT) of Title XIX, added to the Act in 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6403, 103 Stat. 2106, 2262-64 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (Supp. IV
1992)), has played an important role in cases involving organ transplant coverage. EPSDT services are mandatory for all Medicaid recipients under age 21,
and must include reasonable medical, dental, vision, hearing, and mental
health screening services, as well as immunizations and laboratory tests. 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(r). The EPSDT provision also requires states to provide treatment for any condition discovered through such screening "whether or not such
services are covered under the State plan." Id. § 1396d(r)(5). See infra notes
92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's view of the effect
of the EPSDT provision on coverage of transplants); infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's view of the EPSDT provision in
a transplant coverage case).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) (1988).
40. For example, Medicaid would cover corrective surgery for a gastric ulcer because it is an "inpatient hospital service," which is a mandated service
category under Title XIX, even though the statute does not mention "ulcer surgery," or even "surgery," as a mandated service.
41. Title XIX lists the following optional service categories: medical services provided by non-physicians; home health care services; private duty nursing services; clinic services; dental services; physical therapy and related
services; prescription drugs, dentures, prosthetics, and eyeglasses; other diagnostic screening, preventive and rehabilitative services for physical or mental
disabilities; institutional care for persons with "mental diseases"; intermediate
care facilities for persons with mental retardation; inpatient psychiatric services for persons under 21; hospice care; case management services; respiratory
care services; other medical or remedial care specified by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services; home and community based services for the elderly; and supported living services for persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a)(6)-(16), (18)-(20), (22)-(24) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). These services
are optional because § 1396a(10)(A) does not include these services as medical
assistance that a state must provide.
42. MEDICAID TRENDs AND OPTIONS, supra note 17, at 11. As of October 1,
1991, all states provided at least some optional services. State coverage of optional services ranged from a low of 14 covered services (in Alabama, Georgia,
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services to the medically needy than to the categorically needy,
or to place greater limitations on services to the medically
needy.4 3 Title XIX requires states, however, to insure that services to the categorically needy are at least as extensive as those
offered to the medically needy, and prohibits states from making
distinctions among recipients qualifying as categorically
needy.44 Furthermore, HCFA regulations require that services
be "sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably
achieve [their] purpose[s]" 45 and prohibit states from "arbitrarily deny[ing] or reduc[ing] the amount, duration, or scope of a
required service... to an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition."4 6 Finally,
courts have generally followed Supreme Court dicta 4 7 that indicate that, absent some other exception, states must fund all
medically necessary services within mandated service categories
optional service categories that they elected to
and within
provide. 48
and Louisiana) to 30 (in California and Wisconsin). MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 5, at 257. A number of states offer optional services to categorically
needy recipients, but not to medically needy recipients. Id. States that choose
to offer some services to the medically needy must, however, offer a small
number of particular services, including prenatal care and birth delivery services and certain institutional services to persons with mental illness or mental
retardation. MEDICAm TRENDS AND OPrIONs, supra note 17, at 11; see also
MEDICAID SOURCE Boox, supra note 5, at 257 (providing table of optional services); GREEN BoO, supra note 4, at 787 (discussing mandatory pregnancy
services).
43. MEDICAM SOURCE Booi , supra note 5, at 257; GREEN Boo, supra note
4, at 787.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (1988). For example, although some categorically needy recipients are "optionally" categorically needy, if a state chooses
to extend eligibility to some optionally categorically needy persons, the services
it provides must be the same as those it offers to "mandatory" categorically
needy persons. See supra note 23 (discussing difference between "optionally"
and "mandatory" categorically needy categories).
45. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1993).
46. Id. § 440.230(c).
47. "Although serious statutory questions might be presented if a state
Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its coverage, it is
hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund
unnecessary-though perhaps desirable-medical services." Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 444-45 (1977).
48. See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194, 198, 200 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a state may not deny reimbursement for medically necessary drug
treatment for HIV/AIDS); Meyers by Walden v. Reagan, 776 F.2d 241, 243-44
(8th Cir. 1985) (holding that a state may not arbitrarily deny funds for medically necessary electronic communications device when it has chosen to fund
physical therapy services); Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 839 (3d Cir. 1980) (asserting that Beal dicta reflect purpose of Medicaid to provide all medically nec-
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Although Title XIX labels certain services as "mandatory,"
courts have permitted states to restrict provision of those services as well.4 9 The Supreme Court has held that states are not
obligated under the Medicaid statute to fund services or procedures for which federal funds are prohibited. 50 The Court has
essary services in mandatory service categories); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d
546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that state may not deny finding for sex reassignment surgery because the surgery is medically necessary and exclusion resulted from an improper denial of funding based on "diagnosis, type of illness,
or condition"); Planned Parenthood of Missoula, Inc. v. Blouke, 858 F. Supp.
137, 141 (D. Mont. 1994) (holding that a state may not deny funding for abortions when the attending physician's medical judgment indicates the procedure
is necessary to protect the patient's "'physical, emotional, psychological, [and]
familial' needs") (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)); Montoya v.
Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511, 514 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that the state must
not set "arbitrary and unreasonable" payment caps that serve to deny medically
necessary services to eligible Medicaid recipients); Allen v. Mansour, 681 F.
Supp. 1232, 1238-39 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that a state's denial of medically necessary liver transplant for recipient suffering from alcoholic cirrhosis
was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore violated the Act). But cf
Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir.) (asserting that Beal dicta
do not require a "flat rule that all services within the five general categories
deemed 'medically necessary' by a patient's physician must be provided by the
State plan"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, and cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979).
Courts have also struck down state caps on payment for mandated services,
when the cap is so low as to effectively prevent any health provider from providing the service. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Johnston, 701 F.2d 337, 352 (5th Cir. 1983)
(invalidating Texas's elimination and limitation of preventive dental services
mandated by Title XIX EPSDT provisions); Montoya, 654 F. Supp. at 514 (striking down Montana's $50,000 cap on payment for liver transplants, when actual
cost was estimated at greater than $200,000).
49. See supra note 48 (indicating that courts allow restrictions to Medicaid
services when they are not arbitrary or unreasonable). Medicaid recipients
may challenge state Medicaid policies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction
under § 1983 to hear claims alleging state violations of the Social Security Act).
Health care providers also have a § 1983 cause of action to challenge state determinations of reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.
498, 512 (1990). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of implied
causes of action in the Medicaid program and other social welfare programs, see
Rand E. Rosenblatt, Statutory Interpretationand Distributive Justice: Medicaid HospitalReimbursement and the Debate Over Public Choice, 35 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 793 (1991) (concluding that a distributive justice theory provides a better approach to interpretation of the Medicaid Act than the traditional techniques of statutory interpretation currently used by the Supreme Court).
50. "Title XIX does not require a participating State to include in its plan
any services for which... Congress has withheld federal funding." Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980). In Harris,the Court held that, when Congress had barred the use of federal Medicaid funds for most abortions, states
were not required under Title XIX to pay for abortions for which federal funds
were withheld. Id. at 310-11. The Court has decided very few cases that involved the scope of coverage provided to Medicaid recipients under Title XIX;
almost all of the Court's decisions in this area came in the late 1970s and early
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also held that although states generally must provide all medically necessary services, states may place constraints on the determination of medical necessity. 5 1 Similarly, states may place
some limits on use of mandatory services, such as caps on the
number of days of inpatient hospitalization. 52 Furthermore,
HCFA has determined that "experimental" procedures are per
se outside the definition of "medical necessity" and therefore will
not provide federal funds for such procedures.5 3 Although Title
XIX makes no mention of an exception for experimental procedures and HCFA has never defined "experimental" by formal
rule, courts have generally followed HCFA's informal definition:
experimental procedures are those that are "rarely used, novel
or relatively unknown" and which lack "authoritative evidence"
54
of safety and effectiveness.
1980s and involved restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions. See, e.g., Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per
curiam); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
51. Beal, 432 U.S. at 444, 446 n.10, 447 (holding that a state may prohibit
funding of "nontherapeutic" abortions, even though family planning services
are a mandated service under Title XIX).
52. See, e.g., Charleston Memorial Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 329-30
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding that a state could impose yearly limit on number of
days of inpatient hospital coverage); Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 652-53 (5th
Cir.) (holding that state may limit number of physician visits), modified, 648
F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980); Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 786
(E.D. Va. 1977) (holding that state could impose 21-day limit on inpatient hospital care). In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge
under the federal Rehabilitation Act to a 14-day cap on Medicaid-provided inpatient hospital services. 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985). The Court, although noting
Conrad and other cases, did not expressly reach the question of whether or
when Title XIX permits such limits. Id. at 303 & n.23. In discussing the scope
of coverage provided by Medicaid, however, the Court noted:
Medicaid programs do not guarantee that each recipient will receive
that level of health care precisely tailored to his or her particular
needs. Instead, the benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular
package of health care services ... [that] has the general aim of assuring that individuals will receive necessary medical care, but the benefit
provided remains the individual services offered-not "adequate
health care."
Id. at 303.
53. Enclosure No. 2 to Intermediary Letters Nos. 77-4 & 77-5, [1976 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 28,152, at 10,603.
54. Id.; see also Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (7th
Cir. 1993) (reinforcing that a state may refuse to fund liver-bowel transplant if
determined to be experimental); Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156-57 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that state may prohibit gender reassignment surgery if it
makes a reasonable determination that the surgery is experimental). The issue
of Medicaid funding of experimental or investigational medical procedures is
complex. No provision in Title XIX or in HCFA regulations explicitly bars funding for such procedures, or even defines "experimental" or "investigational."
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MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ORGAN TRANSPLANTS

In the words of Chief Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit,
55
"organ transplants are a special situation" under Title XIX.
Until 1985, Title XIX contained no specific provisions relating to
Medicaid funding for organ transplant surgery. In 1985, Congress amended Title XIX to provide criteria for federal financial
56
participation for transplants provided under state plans. The
organ transplant provision, located at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(1),
Despite this, HCFA takes the position that Title XIX bars federal financial participation for such procedures, and appears willing to give the states discretion
to determine which procedures are considered experimental. Courts facing issues in this area have litile guidance, and apply varying depths of review in
attempting to determine whether a state's determination that a procedure is
"experimental" is reasonable. CompareRush, 625 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that
courts should defer to a state's determination that transsexual surgery is experimental if that determination is reasonable) with McLaughlin v. Williams, 801
F. Supp. 633, 638-44 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (conducting detailed review and invalidation of state's determination that liver-bowel transplant was experimental).
For a discussion of judicial review in this area in both public and private health
care systems, see Richard S. Saver, Note, ReimbursingNew Technologies: Why
Are the Courts Judging ExperimentalMedicine?, 44 STA. L. REv. 1095, 10981104 (1992) (concluding that judicial response to the dilemmas embodied in experimental exclusion cases has been inadequate).
55. Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988).
56. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA
1985), Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9507, 100 Stat. 82, 210 (1986). As presently codified, the relevant provisions read:
(i) Payment for organ transplants; item or service furnished by excluded individual, entity, or physicians; other restrictions
Payment under the preceding provisions of this section
[describing federal financial participation in state Medicaid expenditures] shall not be made(1) for organ transplant procedures unless the State plan
provides for written standards respecting the coverage
of such procedures and unless such standards provide
that(A) similarly situated individuals are treated
alike; and
(B) any restriction, on the facilities or practitioners which may provide such procedures, is consistent with the accessibility of high quality care to
individuals eligible for the procedures under the
State plan.
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i) (1988). In addition to adding the organ transplant provision, Congress substantially modified eligibility standards and other provisions
of Title XIX in the COBRA 1985 amendments. These changes included the expansion of optional coverage for pregnant women and children, the addition of
new optional medical services, and the establishment of requirements for
stronger regulation of intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation. Kinney, supra note 13, at 877; see also infra text accompanying
notes 174-176 (describing COBRA 1985 amendments to Title XIX). Congress
amended the transplant provision slightly in the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
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requires states to develop written standards for coverage of
transplants, to treat similarly situated individuals alike with respect to those standards, and to insure that state guidelines do
not interfere with quality of care. 5 7 HCFA asserts that organ
transplants are optional services under Title XIX, 5 8 although it
has never promulgated a rule on this issue.59
60
Coverage of organ transplants by the states varies widely.
Almost all of the states provide funding for the most established
transplant procedures, such as heart, kidney, and liver transplants, at least for categorically needy beneficiaries who meet
state criteria. 6 ' States are less likely to fund newer procedures,
such as heart-lung transplants. 6 2 In addition, some states fund
some transplants for categorically needy recipients, but not for
the medically needy.63 States have also set restrictions on the
tion Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4118(d), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-155. See
infra note 130 (quoting 1987 amendments).
57. See supra note 56 (quoting the text of the provision). The HCFA implementing regulations for § 1396b(i)(1) adopt the statutory language almost verbatim. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.35 (1993). The regulations state in addition that the
statutory and regulatory guidelines for federal financial participation in transplants do not "permit[ I a State to provide, under its plan, services that are not
reasonable in amount, duration, and scope to achieve their purpose." 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.35(b) (1993).
58. Medicaid Program; Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and
Treatment Services Defined, 58 Fed. Reg. 51288, 51293 (1993) ("Organ transplants are not explicitly included as a service under the definition of 'medical
assistance' in [R 1396b(i) of Title XIX] of the Act, which describes those items
and services not subject to payment under State plans, makes organ transplants optional."); see also MEDICAID SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 292 ("Individual states can make their own decisions with respect to coverage of
transplants under Medicaid, provided certain requirements are met.").
59. The only HCFA rulemaking in regard to Medicaid funding of transplants is 42 C.F.R. § 441.35 (1993), which merely tracks the language of the
transplant provision in Title XIX See supra note 57.
60. MEDICAID SOURCE Boo, supra note 5, at 292-94.
61. Id. at 293-94. In 1990, of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 39
provided reimbursement for heart transplants, 47 for liver transplants, and 49
for kidney transplants. Id. at 294-95. In 1990, Wyoming stood alone in offering
no transplant reimbursement of any sort. Id. at 295.
62. In 1990, 23 states reimbursed heart-lung transplants, 15 reimbursed
lung transplants, and only 12 reimbursed pancreas transplants. Id. at 294-95.
63. New Jersey, for instance, as of March 1992, funded heart, heart-lung,
kidney, and liver transplants for categorically needy Medicaid recipients, 1d. at
293-94, but funded no transplant surgery for medically needy recipients, II
MEDICAID BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICAID
sPDATA SYSTEM, CHARACTERSTICS OF MEDICAID STATE PROGRAMS, STATE-BYSTATE PROFILES

661 (1992). Similarly, as of 1992, South Dakota reimbursed

heart, kidney, and liver transplants for the categorically needy who met state
criteria, MEDICAID SOURCE BoO, supra note 5, at 293-94, but provided no
Medicaid coverage to the "medically needy," GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 787.
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types of medical conditions that will trigger reimbursement for
transplant procedures, 64 and have funded some organ transplants while choosing not to fund transplants of the same organ
that use different technologies or procedures. 65
II. THE EXTENT OF STATE DISCRETION: THE SPLIT
AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Since 1988, five United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
have considered the extent to which the Medicaid statute requires states to fund organ transplants. The Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have held that states have complete discretion in choosing which transplants, if any, to include in state Medicaid
plans. 6 6 The Fourth Circuit has held that states do not have
specific statutory discretion to deny transplants for needy recipients. 67 The Eleventh Circuit has held states must pay for transplants for children who receive Medicaid. 68 The Seventh Circuit
has avoided decision on this question by resolving a transplant
coverage dispute on other grounds. 6 9 Currently, therefore, the
scope of discretion states have in transplant funding decisions is
quite muddled, and judicial opinion is unsettled in general on
how best to deal with scope of coverage issues involving innovative medical technologies in the cooperative federalism context
of the Medicaid program.

64. Such restrictions, however, may well prove vulnerable to HOFA rules
that prohibit denial of services "to an otherwise eligible recipient solely because
of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1993).
See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
denial of funding for sex reassignment surgery was impermissibly based on
diagnosis).
65. See, e.g., Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (9th Cir.) (permitting state's denial of funding for allogenic bone marrow transplants under
Title XIX, even though state did fund autologous bone marrow transplants),
modified, 984 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 1117; Meusberger v. Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280, 1282(8th Cir. 1990);
Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 53 (8th Cir. 1988).
67. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1993). As
discussed infra note 96, the Fourth Circuit's precise holding in Pereirais somewhat confusing. It is, however, safe to say that the Fourth Circuit specifically
rejected Ellis, Meusberger, and Dexter. Pereira, 996 F.2d at 726.
68. Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 998
F.2d 887 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
69. Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993).
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A. Tim EIGHTH AND NINTH Cmcurrs: STATES HAvE
COMPLETE DIscREToN IN TRANSPLANT FUNDING

In 1988, the Eighth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to reach a decision on state discretion in transplant
0 Brandy Ellis was a tenfunding in Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson.7
month-old girl who suffered from biliary atresia, a liver condition that was likely to kill her in less than a year unless she
received a liver transplant.7 1 The Arkansas Medicaid program
denied assurance of payment for a transplant because the state
72
had not chosen to fund liver transplants under its state plan.
The Eighth Circuit held that the organ transplant provision,
§ 1396b(i)(1) of Title XIX73 gives states discretion to choose "to
[to] choose
fund organ transplants under Medicaid, and ...
which kinds of organ transplants, if any, to cover." 74
The court recognized that § 1396b(i)(1) could "be read as
merely laying out additional standards the states must meet to
receive federal funds for organ transplants,"7 5 rather than as an
affirmative grant of discretion. The court, however, relied on the
legislative history of the 1987 amendments of § 1396b(i)(1) in
concluding that Congress's intent in enacting the provision was
to grant states discretion in transplant funding. 7 6 The court re70. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 53.
Earlier in 1988, the Fourth Circuit had enjoined Virginia to provide Medicaid funding for a liver transplant for a four-year-old girl in Todd by Todd v.
Sorrell, 841 F.2d 87, 90 (4th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff, who needed a liver transplant because of her condition of secondary biliary cirrhosis, had argued that
Virginia's state plan violated § 1396b(i)(1) because it funded liver transplants
only for persons with a diagnosis of extrahepatic biliary atresia. Id. at 89. The
court, however, declined to rule on the validity of Virginia's criteria, reaching
instead the rather odd conclusion that the plaintiff had "substantially complied"
with the state's criteria because secondary biliary cirrhosis was sufficiently
comparable to extrahepatic biliary atresia. Id. at 89, 90.
71. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 53.
72. Id. at 54. At the time, Arkansas provided for cornea transplants and
renal (kidney) transplants under its Medicaid plan. Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson,
713 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Ark), vacated, 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988). In earlier proceedings, Judge Arnold had granted an emergency injunction ordering
the state to assure payment so that Brandy Ellis could have her transplant
surgery. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 53 n.2; see also infra text accompanying note 199
(quoting from Judge Arnold's grant of injunction).
73. See supra note 56 for the text of the transplant provision.
74. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 55.
75. Id. This one sentence comprised the court's full discussion of the statutory text. The statutory provision on transplants appeared only in a footnote,
with no commentary. Id. at 55 n.6.
76. Id. at 55. The court cited the House Report and the House Conference
Report for the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4118,

1248

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1233

jected Ellis's assertion that if Congress had wanted to grant
states discretion, it would have done so explicitly. 77 The court
also reasoned that state discretion in this area was "consistent
with the policy behind the Medicaid Act."78 Finally, the court
noted that other circuits had upheld state limitations on funding
of medically necessary procedures, 7 9 and that it would be "unrealistic" to interpret Title XIX to require states to fund expensive and risky procedures such as organ transplants.8 0 The
101 Stat. 1330, which contained the amendments to the Medicaid statute. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 55. The court cited the following language in the House Report:
To assure that State coverage decisions for organ transplants are
based on clear principles consistently applied, and not on political or
media considerations, section 9507 of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), P.L. 99-272 [which first enacted the
transplant provisions], requires that a State which covers organ transplant procedures set forth under its Medicaid plan written standards
respecting the coverage of such procedures. Under these standards,
similarly situated individuals must be treated alike.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 391(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 532 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-352). The court cited the following language
from the House Conference Report:
(e) Organ Transplant Technical-States which choose to cover organ
transplant procedures may restrict the facilities or practitioners from
whom Medicaid beneficiaries may obtain the services, so long as the
restrictions are consistent with accessibility of high quality care, and
so long as similarly situated individuals are treated alike.
Id. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 756 (1987), reprinted
in 1987 U.S.C.C.AN. 2313-1245, 2313-1502).
77. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 55.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The court stated:
[W]e think plaintiff's position that all organ transplants (including
hearts and lungs) must be covered by Medicaid is unrealistic. Surely
Congress did not intend to require the states to provide funds for exotic
surgeries which, while they might be the individual patient's only hope
for survival, would also have a small chance of success and carry an
enormous price tag. Medicaid was not designed to fund risky, unproven procedures, but to provide the largest number of necessary
medical services to the greatest number of needy people.
Id. at 55.
The "risky, unproven" surgery with "small chance of success" sought by
Brandy Ellis was nonetheless noted by the court to have "a 90% chance [of allowing her] to live an active and normal life for the next five years." Id. at 53,
55 (footnote omitted); see also infra text accompanying notes 143-156 (critiquing
this tension and the interpretive assumption that leads to it).
Despite the Eighth Circuit's holding on the meaning of § 1396b(i)(1),
Brandy Ellis did receive assurance that her transplant would be funded. Five
days before the court heard the appeal, Judge Arnold issued an injunction directing the state to give assurance of payment to Brandy's medical provider to
keep her on a waiting list for transplant surgery. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 53 n.2.
Furthermore, the state of Arkansas changed its state plan prior to Ellis's appeal, and began to fund some liver transplants; the Eighth Circuit, after declar-
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Eight Circuit reaffirmed its view of complete state discretion in
coverage of transplants in 1990.81
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit adopted and extended the holdof
Ellis in Dexter v. Kirschner.8 2 In Dexter, Arizona denied
ing
Medicaid funding for an allogenic bone marrow transplant to
treat the plaintiff's leukemia.8 3 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
ing that the state had no obligation under Title XIX to fund any transplants,
remanded the case to District Court to determine whether the amended state
plan funded at a reasonable level those transplants the state chose to cover. Id.
at 56. The court kept the injunction in place pending this determination on
remand. Id. This turn of events led the Fourth Circuit to later characterize the
Eighth Circuit's interpretation in Ellis of the scope of mandated coverage under
Title XIX as dicta. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 726 (4th Cir.
1993).
81. Meusberger v. Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280, 1282 (8th Cir. 1990). Although
the court in Meusberger reiterated that states may choose to fund some or no
transplants, its opinion reflects the uneasiness that courts have in denying lifesaving medical care under Medicaid. The plaintiff in Meusberger required a
pancreas transplant. The state of Iowa had chosen to fund only those organ
transplants "designated nonexperimental by Medicare." Id. at 1282 n.4. Because HCFA determined that pancreas transplants were investigational and,
thus, not covered under Medicare, the state refused to fund pancreas transplants under its Medicaid plan. Id. at 1283. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's finding that pancreas transplants were not "experimental," despite HCFA's determination not to fund pancreas transplants under Medicare.
Id. at 1283-84. The court refused to defer to the state's determination that pancreas transplants were "experimental," and affirmed the district court's injunction directing the funding of Meusberger's transplant. Id. at 1284.
One member of the panel dissented sharply, asserting that the court's decision contradicted the holding in Ellis, that the state had rationally determined
that pancreas transplants were experimental, and that the state reasonably
had adopted the federal standards for Medicare in denying Medicaid funding.
Id. at 1284 (Beam, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge also rebuked the majority for determining that HCFA's characterization of pancreas transplants as
"investigational" (and therefore not funded under Medicare) was not equivalent
to "experimental." Id. at 1285 n8 (Beam, J., dissenting).
82. 972 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir.), modified, 984 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 1115. Autologous bone marrow transplants involve a harvesting
of the patient's own bone marrow, which doctors later replace following chemotherapy. Id. at 1115. Autologous bone marrow transplants are completely ineffective in treating Sheri Dexter's type of leukemia; allogenic bone marrow
transplants are the only effective transplant procedure. Id. In allogenic bone
marrow transplants, the patient receives extremely intensive chemotherapy,
followed by transplantation of bone marrow harvested from a donor. Id. The
court in Dexter stated that allogenic bone marrow transplants are "not experimental" and noted that "Dexter's physicians estimated that with an allogenic
bone marrow transplant, she had a 60% to 90% chance of long-term, disease
free survival." Id. The district court had held that the state violated both Title
XIX and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1116.
Dexter contended that allogenic bone marrow transplant was a medically necessary procedure, and that Arizona violated Title XIX by not including the procedure in its state plan. Id. at 1117. Dexter further argued that because the
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state's exclusion of allogenic bone marrow transplants from its
Medicaid plan.8 4 The court focused on § 1396b(i)(1), stating that
the provision "does not make payments mandatory," but "states
only what must occur in the event a state should decide, in its
discretion, to pay for organ transplants."8 5 The court reasoned
that the Eighth Circuit had held that "organ transplants are excepted from Medicaid funding even when they are medically
necessary because they are not among the listed required services" 8 6 and agreed with this interpretation of the Ellis holding.
The court, following Ellis, relied heavily on the legislative history of the 1987 amendment to § 1396b(i)(1), and found that
organ transplant funding to be
Congress intended
87
discretionary.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Dexter's argument that Arizona's decision to fund autologous bone marrow transplants but
not allogenic bone marrow transplants violated the "similarly
situated" requirement of § 1396b(i)(1).8 8 The court held that the
"similarly situated" language only required similar treatment of
patients who could be treated by the same transplant procedure,
not that all patients with similar diseases should receive the
most appropriate procedure.8 9 The question, according to the
Ninth Circuit, is whether a Medicaid recipient is "unreasonably
denied a covered" transplant procedure. 90 The court found that
Arizona could, therefore, permissibly fund autologous transplants-so long as it treated all beneficiaries similarly with respect to that specific procedure-while refusing to fund allogenic
transplants. The court noted that requiring states to provide all
persons with similar diseases with the particular transplants
they needed "would lead to Medicaid funding of almost all organ
transplants."9 1
state had elected to fund a related procedure, autologous bone marrow transplants, the state violated the requirements of the organ transplant provisions of
Title XIX which state that "similarly treated people are treated alike." Id.
Sheri Dexter-having not received the transplant she needed-died before the
Ninth Circuit heard her appeal. Id. at 1115. The court permitted the Leukemia
Society of America to intervene and ruled that Dexter's death did not moot her
appeal. Id. at 1116 n.2.
84. Id. at 1121.
85. Id. at 1117.
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1119-20.
89. Id. at 1120.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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B. THE FouRTH AND ELEvENTH Cmcurrs: STATES MUST FuND
MEDICALLY NECESSARY TRANSPLANTS

In 1993, in Pereiraby Pereirav. Kozlowski, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the reasoning in Ellis and Dexter, and ordered the state of Virginia to provide Medicaid funding for a
heart transplant for four-year-old Natalia Pereira. 92 The district court had previously ordered the state to pay on the ground
that the early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment
(EPSDT) service category-a mandatory service for Medicaid recipients under age twenty-one-expressly provides that states
pay for treatment for medical conditions discovered by EPSDT
screening services 93 "whether or not such services are covered
94
under the State plan."
On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but expressly declined to rely on the EPSDT provision. 95 The court concluded
instead that the state simply did not have discretion to deny
medically necessary transplant procedures. 96 The court rejected
92. 996 F.2d 723, 725-27 (4th Cir. 1993). Under its state Medicaid plan,
Virginia (like Arkansas in Ellis) had chosen to fund cornea transplants and
kidney transplants. Id. at 724. Natalia Pereira had been a healthy child until
her heart had been damaged by a viral infection during a hospital stay for treatment of chicken pox. Matt Neufeld, Heart OperationCovered: 4-year-old Wins
Suit for Medicaid, WASH. TIMEs, June 28, 1993, at BI. Natalia had already
received a new heart by the time of the court's ruling, and had recovered well.
Id.
93. Pereira, 996 F.2d at 724.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (Supp. IV 1992); see also supra note 38 (discussing EPSDT provisions of Title XIX).
95. Pereira,996 F.2d at 724-25.
96. The court stated that the EPSDT provisions "indisputably required"
states to fund all necessary treatment for children, 996 F.2d at 727, but expressly rejected the district court's holding that § 1396b(i)(1) gave states initial
discretion in funding of transplants, which the EPSDT provisions effectively
trumped. Id. at 725.
Despite its broad construction of the non-discretionary nature of reimbursement for transplants, the court appeared to limit its holding to Medicaid
recipients under age 21. "[We hold that the Commonwealth is required... to
provide funds for medically necessary transplants to children under the ages of
twenty-one who are otherwise qualified under the State's Medicaid plan." Id. at
727. It is not entirely clear why the court so limited its holding to children,
given its clear rejection of the state's argument that transplants are an optional
service. In a concurring opinion, one member of the panel noted this apparent
tension between the narrow holding and the court's reasoning:
The court's construction of the Medicaid statute is honest and faithful
to its plain language. However, its interpretation that [the transplant
funding provision] does not grant states the discretion to fund organ
transplants will invariably open the door to individuals over the ages
of twenty-one to claim that states ... are required to pay for their
organ transplants under the Medicaid statute because the procedure is
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Virginia's argument that § 1396b(i)(1) constituted an affirmative
97
grant of discretion to states on transplant funding decisions.
The court focused on the text of the transplant provisions and
asserted that those provisions only set forth conditions that
states must meet before receiving federal matching funds for
transplants. 98 The court noted that to interpret the transplant
provision as an affirmative grant of state discretion would create
inconsistencies with the other provisions of § 1396b(i). 9 9 The
court also argued that Congress had not listed organ transplant
procedures in the section of the statute that described optional
services.' 0 0 The court dismissed the state's argument that the
legislative history of § 1396b(i)(1) indicated congressional intent
to grant states discretion, and criticized the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Ellis, finding the Eighth Circuit's discussion of the
text of the provision inadequate' 0 1 and the legislative history

medically necessary.... Whether a state would be required to pay for
such services presents a profoundly troubling question.
Id. at 727-728 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 725.
98. Id. at 725, 726.
99. Id. at 725 ('The tenuousness of the Commonwealth's textual argument
is evidenced by its need to read subparagraph one of section 1396b(i) differently
from the remaining subparagraphs... so as to avoid the statutory inconsistencies that would otherwise result."). Specifically, the court reasoned that
§ 1396b(i) contains, in addition to the transplant provision, 13 other limitations
imposed on state plans as conditions for federal financial participation. Id. Because many of these restrictions involve service categories, such as physician
services, that are indisputably mandatory services under Title XIX, the court
reasoned that to read the transplant provision as a grant of discretion would
imply that the other provisions in the section are also grants of discretion, an
absurd result. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 113-120 for further discussion of this argument.
100. "When Congress has intended to make provision of a medical service
optional within the state's discretion, it has listed that service [among the optional service categories] in section 1396d(a), but refrained from making its provision mandatory pursuant to section 1396a(a)(10)." Pereira,996 F.2d at 725.
101. The court explained:
[The Eighth Circuit in Ellis] did not even attempt to rest its decision on
the text of the statute; indeed, it appeared to concede that the statute's
language supports our holding today... We believe not only that the
language [of the transplant provision] 'can be read' in the way conceded by Ellis, but that it must be so read ....
Id. at 726. The Fourth Circuit also noted and criticized the contrary holdings of
Dexter, Meusberger, and the district court's holding in Miller by Miller v.
Whitburn, 816 F. Supp. 505 (W.D. Wis.), vacated, 10 F.3d 1315, 1321 (7th Cir.
1993). Pereira,996 F.2d at 726.
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unpersuasive.' 0 2 The court, therefore, strongly rejected the
state's claim of discretion and ordered payment.1 0 3
Six weeks after the decision in Pereira,the Eleventh Circuit
ordered Florida to pay for a liver-bowel transplant for fifteenmonth-old Lexen Pittman in Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.'0 4 The
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
which administers the Florida Medicaid program, had not chosen to fund liver-bowel transplants and therefore denied Lexen's
request for funding. 0 5 The court in Pittman surveyed the prior
cases on the scope of state discretion on transplant funding, 0 6
and, agreeing with Pereira,expressed that § 1396b(i)(1) probably did not give states discretion in funding transplants.L0 7 Despite its agreement with the Fourth Circuit, the court in
102. "M[The Eighth Circuit's resort to legislative history was not only unwarranted but improper. Even if it were not, however, that history does not compel
(if it even supports) the conclusion reached in Ellis." Pereira,996 F.2d at 726.
103. Id. at 727. The court's concluding paragraph is unusually forceful:
[We are not] unmindful of the significant jurisprudential considerations that inform this decision. It may be, as the court in Ellis concluded, that from a policy perspective it is "unrealistic" to believe that
Congress extended Medicaid coverage to organ transplants. It may
even be, as the Commonwealth vigorously argues, that Congress intended by [§ 1396b(i)(1)] to afford the states absolute discretion
whether to find organ transplants. If it did so intend, however (and
there is no evidence in either the statute or its history that this was its
intention), it did not embody that intention in statute. And we have no
more authority to give effect to that which was never enacted than we
do to give effect to that which was never intended. Such is the rule of
law.

Id.

104. 998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650
(1993). Lexen suffered from short-bowel syndrome, a condition that greatly impaired his digestive functioning. Id. at 888. Lexen received all nutrients intravenously, which-although it kept him alive-also progressively destroyed his
liver. Id. Lexen therefore required replacement of both his liver and bowel, or
he was likely to die within one year. Id. Although the state agency had originally asserted that it did not have to pay for liver-bowel transplants on the
grounds that they are experimental procedures, the agency subsequently abandoned this argument and asserted only that § 1396b(i)(1) gave it discretion on
transplant coverage decisions. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 889-91.
107. The court stated:
We, like the Fourth Circuit [in Pereira],doubt that § 1396b(i)(1) gives
the states discretion to elect not to cover organ transplants. It seems
more likely that the subsection is a statement imposing conditions for
federal funding of organ transplants, rather than an affirmative grant
of discretion. We find persuasive the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the
legislative history and its conclusion that that history is inconclusive.
Id. at 891.
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Pittman declined to make a specific holding on the issue of the
scope of state discretion, relying instead on the clear language of
the EPSDT provision requiring states to provide all medically
necessary services to children receiving EPSDT services under
Medicaid. 0 8
III. PITFALLS IN INTERPRETING TITLE XIX: A
CRITIQUE OF ELLIS, DEXTER, AND PEREIRA
The efforts of the circuit courts to make sense of the transplant provisions of Title XIX and to determine whether transplants are mandatory or optional services under Medicaid
illustrate not only the obtuseness of the Medicaid statute, but
also judicial uncertainty over how to approach an enormous federal-state program that has expanded beyond all expectations
since 1965. Furthermore, the courts' efforts reveal the difficulties involved in divining the meaning of a statutory scheme that
creates broad categories, such as "inpatient hospital services,"
"medically necessary," and "experimental," which constantly
change meaning in light of the emergence and development of
new medical technology.
A. Tm RIDDLE OF THE MEDICAID TRANsPLANT PRovisIoN,
SECTION 1396b(i)(1)
The courts that have attempted to interpret § 1396b(i)(1)
have started their analyses with two assumptions. The first assumption is that courts can find congressional intent to make
108. The court explained:
We are not compelled, in this case, to decide the question of what, if
any, discretion § 1396b(i)(1) grants to the states because of the clear
mandate of [the EPSDT provisions].... Thus, even if [the transplant
provisions] were construed to give Florida discretion not to provide
fimding of organ transplants, the 1989 amendment [to the EPSDT provision] took it away for individuals under the age of twenty-one who
are otherwise qualified under the state plan.
Id. at 891-92. In basing its decision on the narrower ground that the EPSDT
provision required the state to provide Lexen's transplant, the Fourth Circuit
essentially reached the same conclusion as the district court in Pereira. See
supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
Following the decisions in Pereiraand Pittman, HCFA announced that it
would now consider non-experimental transplant procedures for children as
mandated under the EPSDT provision. Medicaid Program; Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services Defined, 58 Fed. Reg. 51288,
51293 (1993) ("[We have decided that the superseding EPSDT legislation
makes organ transplants mandatory for EPSDT recipients."). HCFA continues
to assert, however, that organ transplants for adult Medicaid recipients are optional services. Id.
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transplants either mandatory or optional by reference to the text
of the transplant ftmding provision and its legislative history.
The second assumption is that states must treat organ transplants generically as either mandatory or optional under the
statutory scheme. Both of these interpretive assumptions are
incorrect, and lay the foundations for unsatisfactory decisions.
1.

The Statutory Text

Although the circuits differ sharply on its import, the text of
§ 1396b(i)(1) is relatively short and clear in comparison to much
of Title XIX.' 0 9 According to § 1396b(i)(1), the federal government will not supplement state payments "for organ transplant
procedures unless the State plan provides for written standards."1 10 State standards must also ensure that "similarly situated individuals are treated alike" 1 ' and that "any restriction,
on the facilities or practitioners which may provide such procedures, is consistent with the accessibility of high quality care to2
individuals eligible for the procedures under the State plan.""
The dispute among the circuits is whether this language merely
states conditions for receipt of federal funds, or whether it also
constitutes an affirmative grant of discretion to states to determine coverage.
As the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Pereira,construing the
transplant funding subsection as an affirmative grant of state
discretion would make the provision inconsistent with the rest of
§ 1396b(i)." 3 The other subsections of § 1396b(i) place conditions on receipt of federal funds for a variety of different kinds1of4
medical services. These include inpatient hospital services,
116 and
diagnostic laboratory tests, 1 5 nursing facility services,
1 17 all of which are indisputably mandatory
physicians' services,
service categories under Title XIX"18 To read the transplant
subsection as a grant of state discretion would imply that these
other subsections are similarly grants of discretion, which would
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra note 56 for the complete text of the provision.
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(1) (1988).
Id. § 1396b(i)(1)(A).
Id. § 1396b(i)(1)(B).
See supra note 99 (citing the Fourth Circuit's view on this point).
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(3) (1988).
Id. § 1396b(i)(7).
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(11) (Supp. IV 1992).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(i)(12), (14) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
See supra note 38 (listing mandatory service categories).
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be "squarely at odds" 1 9 with the provisions of Title XIX that
120
mandate those services.
In addition, if § 1396b(i)(1) were an affirmative grant of discretion to states on transplant funding, this would imply that
prior to enactment of that subsection, states had no statutory
basis for such discretion. The enactment of § 1396b(i)(1) would
therefore represent a substantial new limitation on the services
available to Medicaid recipients. The language of the provision,
however, clearly protects recipients: the provision requires
states to develop written standards, treat similarly situated people alike, and insure that no restrictions on the facilities or physicians who provide transplants under the state plan interfere
with quality of care.' 2 ' The provision purports only to prevent
states from unfairly allocating transplant funding and failing to
ensure high quality of care.
Although § 1396b(i)(1) does not, by way of its text, persuasively indicate that transplants are discretionary, neither does it
indicate that transplants are mandatory.' 22 The section's location within the statute certainly does not compel such a conclusion; although many of the restrictions on funding described in
§ 1396b(i) involve mandated services, one involves provision of
drug products, an optional service. 12 3 Furthermore, some of the
other restrictions in § 1396b(i) are not simply conditions that
states must meet in order to receive federal funding; rather,
they are prohibitions on federal funding of otherwise
"mandatory" medical services when provided under certain circumstances or by particular providers. For example, one provision prohibits federal financial participation for "inpatient
hospital tests.., not specifically ordered by the attending physician or other responsible practitioner." 12 4 A state would not be
obligated to pay for such an inpatient hospital test, even though
Title XIX ordinarily mandates such tests.'2 5 The text of the
119. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1993).
120. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory service categories).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(1) (1988); see also supra note 56 (stating the text of
the provision).
122. The Fourth Circuit in Pereirastated no statutory basis for characterizing Natalia Pereira's heart transplant as a mandated service, other than Virginia's fortunate (for Natalia) concession that, absent an affirmative grant in
the transplant provision, organ transplants are mandated. 996 F.2d at 724.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(5) (1988).
124. Id. § 1396b(i)(6).
125. In Harrisv. McRae, the Court stated:
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transplant provision does not by itself, therefore, readily indicate whether transplants are mandatory or optional services.
2. The Legislative History
The sparse legislative history of the transplant provision
provides little persuasive guidance on the issue of state discretion. Congress added the transplant provision to § 1396b(i) in
1985, as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA 1995).126 COBRA 1985 made substantial changes in the Medicaid statute, primarily in the eligibility
provisions. 12 7 The final House, Senate, and Conference reports
not explain or
which accompanied COBRA 1985, however, do 128
discuss the addition of the transplant provision.
The courts in Ellis and Dexter rested their conclusions almost entirely on the legislative history of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 1987).129 OBRA 1987 con[I]f Congress chooses to withdraw federal funding for a particular service, a State is not obliged to continue to pay for that service as a condition of continued federal financial support of other services.... Title
XIX does not obligate a participating State to pay for those medical
services for which federal reimbursement is unavailable.
448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980). This does not mean, however, that merely by setting
restrictions on federal payment for transplants § 1396b(i)(1) -withdraws" federal funding for transplants within the meaning of Harris,because federal
funds are available as long as the state comports with the requirements of
§ 1396b(i)(1). In contrast, in Harris,the court found that Congress had specifically withdrawn all federal funding for elective abortions under the Hyde
Amendment. Id. at 302.
126. See supra note 56 (discussing enactment of the transplant provision).
127. MEDIAID SOURCE BOOK, supranote 5, at 35-37; Kinney, supra note 13,
at 876.
128. Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.), modified, 984 F.2d
979 (9th Cir. 1992); Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988).
The Fourth Circuit in Pereiraalso cited the report prepared by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which accompanied its recommendation on
Medicare and Medicaid amendments in COBRA. 996 F.2d at 727. The court
noted that the report stated that 'the Committee believes that the decision to
extend Medicaid coverage for one or more organ transplant procedures is appropriately within the province of each state." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 265, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1985)). The court noted, however, that the committee report does not purport to say that § 1396b(i)(1) is itself an affirmative grant
of discretion, but rather that the report reflects the committee's belief that state
discretion was in fact the law prior to enactment of the transplant provision.
Id. The committee's comments noted by the court were not incorporated into
the final House or Conference Reports that accompanied COBRA 1985.
129. Dexter, 972 F.2d at 1117; Ellis, 859 F.2d at 55. The courts moved to the
1987 legislative history with virtually no comment on the actual text or statutory context of § 1396b(i)(1). See supra note 75 (discussing the Ellis court's
treatment of the statutory text).
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tained minor technical amendments to the transplant provision.1 3 0 The House Conference Report basically paraphrases the
text of § 1396b(i)(1); the section in its entirety reads:
(e) Organ TransplantTechnical.-States which choose to cover organ
transplant procedures may restrict the facilities or practitioners from
whom Medicaid beneficiaries may obtain the services, so long as the
restrictions are consistent with accessibility of high quality care, and
so long as similarly situated individuals are treated alike. States may
restrict the facilities of practitioners from whom Medicaid beneficiaries
the restrictions are consistent with
may obtain the services, so long as
13 1
accessibility of high quality care.

Similarly, the House Report on the 1987 amendments states
that "[t]o assure that State coverage decisions for organ transplants are based on clear principles consistently applied, and not
on political or media considerations, [§ 1396b(i)(1)] requires that
a State which covers organ transplant procedures set forth
under its Medicaid plan written standards respecting the coverage of such procedures." 13 2 The Eighth Circuit in Ellis inter130. The 1987 changes to the transplant provision itself were extremely minor: "or" was added to the end of the provision to clarify the distinction between
the subsection on transplants and the following subsection. More significantly,
the following paragraph was added to the end of § 1396b(i): "Nothing in paragraph (1) [the transplant funding provision] shall be construed as permitting a
State to provide services under its plan under this title that are not reasonable
in amount, duration, and scope to achieve their purpose." Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4118 (d)(1)(B), 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-155. Although this paragraph does not indicate that transplants are
mandatory services, it is even less consistent with construing the transplant
provision as a grant of discretion to states-like the actual text of the provision,
it provides further assurance of fair procedures and adequate reimbursement
for transplants. The courts in Ellis andDexter, however, did not mention, much
less discuss, the specific changes made by the 1987 amendments.
131. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 495, supra note 76, at 756, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-1502.
132. The entirety of the House Report section reads:
(d) Organ transplanttechnicaL-Undercurrent law, States must offer
certain "mandatory" services, such as inpatient hospital and physicians' services, each of which must be sufficient in amount, duration,
and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose. States may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a mandatory service solely because of an individual's diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition. To assure that State coverage decisions for organ transplants are based on clear principles consistently applied, and not on
political or media considerations, [§ 1396b(i)(1)] requires that a State
which covers organ transplant procedures set forth under its Medicaid
plan written standards respecting the coverage of such procedures.
Under these standards, similarly situated individuals must be treated
alike.
The Committee wishes to clarify that the organ transplant procedures which a State covers, and the hospital, physician, and other services these procedures entail, must be sufficient in amount, duration,
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preted the phrases "States which choose to cover" and "State
which covers" as indications that § 1396b(i)(1) constitutes an affirmative grant of state discretion for transplant coverage. 1 33 If
analysis of the legislative history stops here, then the conclusions in Ellis and Dexter are perfectly reasonable. There are,
however, several reasons to doubt this reliance on and interpretation of the legislative history.
First, relying on legislative history from the 1987 technical
amendments to the transplant provision to deduce Congres34
sional intent in enacting the provision in 1985 is problematic.'
Furthermore, although the phrases "states which choose" and
"state which covers" may imply discretion, the purpose of the
two reports is not to clarify the extent of state discretion, but
simply to paraphrase the transplant provision; using after-thefact "history" in such a case, to answer a question not directly
addressed in either 1985 or 1987 but merely implied, is troubling. When the result is to deny potentially life-saving medical
care, such a circuitous interpretive approach is particularly
troubling.
In addition, if Congress had intended to carve out a "transplant exception" in Medicaid coverage, it is odd that the section
in the House and Conference reports immediately prior to the
section on the transplant provision, entitled "Further clarificaand scope to reasonably achieve their purpose. For example, if a State
covers liver transplants for patients with one medical condition but not
for patients with another, and if a liver transplant is medically indicated and not experimental with respect of each condition, the State's

plan would be out of compliance with the amount, duration, and scope
requirement. The Committee amendment would clarify that the current law requirements for written standards respecting organ transplant procedures must not be construed by HCFA or the States to
permit States to provide services that are not reasonable in amount,
duration, and scope to achieve their purpose. The amendment is effective as if included in section 9507 of COBRA.
H.R. REP. No. 391(1), supra note 76, at 531-32, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C-A.N.
at 2313-351 to -352.
133. Ellis, 859 F.2d at 55. Although it did not directly quote the language of
the reports, the Ninth Circuit referred to and agreed with the Eighth Circuit's
use of the legislative history in Dexter, 972 F.2d at 1116.
134. "[The views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313
(1960). For a discussion of "the use and abuse of subsequent legislative history," see WnLLIas N. ESKRmGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLIcY 752-60 (1988).
The Fourth Circuit in Pereira also criticized this use of subsequent history.
Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[The
legislative history cited in Ellis] does not even represent the belief of the Committee that approved the specific provision here at issue.").
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tion of flexibility for State Medicaid payment systems for inpatient services," 13 5 does not discuss this purported new grant of
state flexibility. Instead, the amendments to § 1396b(i)(1) and
the sections in the House and Conference reports discussing the
amendments all appear under the bland title "Technical and
miscellaneous amendments." 136 If Congress had intended to
create a substantial new limit on life-saving medical procedures,
it did so very quietly.
The most notable problem with the use of the 1987 legislative history in Ellis and Dexter is that the courts focus on two
isolated phrases in the reports, without giving effect to the actual content of the reports. The House Report, in fact, could easily be read to suggest that not only are transplants not subject to
state discretion, but that they are a mandatory service:
Under current law, States must offer certain "mandatory" services,
such as inpatient hospital and physicians services, each of which must
be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its
purpose. States may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a mandatory service solely because of an individual's
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition. To assure that State coverage
decisions for organ transplants are based on clear principles consistently applied, and not on political or media considerations,
[§ 1396b(i)(1)] requires that a State which covers organ transplant procedures set forth under its Medicaid plan written standards respecting
standards, similarly sitthe coverage of such procedures. Under these
137
uated individuals must be treated alike.

Thus, in three consecutive sentences, the House Report restates that Title XIX mandates certain services; affirms that
states may not arbitrarily limit mandatory services; and explains that § 1396b(i)(1) ensures that organ transplant coverage
decisions are made according to clear and consistent principles.
It is difficult to see why the House should, in discussing the
transplant provision, articulate concerns for the fair provision of
mandatory services-unless those mandatory services include
transplants. The Report, therefore, reasonably may affirm that
135. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 495, supra note 76, at 754, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C-A.N. at 2313-1500; H.R. REP. No. 391(I), supra note 76, at 528, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-348.
136. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 495, supra note 76, at 755, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-1501; H.R. REP. No. 391(I), supra note 76, at 529, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-349.
137. H.R. RaP. No. 391(I), supra note 76, at 531-32, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C-.AN. at 2313-351 to -352. The rest of the section in the House Report
on § 1396b(i)(1) similarly focuses primarily on the concern that states not make
arbitrary coverage decisions and that states provide sufficient levels of treatment. See supra note 132 (quoting the entire text of the House Report's discussion of § 1396(b)(i)(1)).
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transplants are mandatory services; the purportedly discretionary grant contained in "states which cover" could refer only to
reasonable denials of coverage in particularinstances,in accordance with guidelines set out under the state plan pursuant to
§ 1396b(i)(1). Given the whole tenor of the House Report, the
Eighth Circuit's argument that the isolated words "which covers" express Congressional intent to limit the scope of
mandatory services loses much of its force. At the least, the
1987 legislative history-to the extent that it is a legitimate indicator of Congressional intent in 1985-could plausibly support
conclusions that transplants are mandatory or that they lie
within state discretion. Given the ambiguity of the statutory
text, the 1987 legislative history is a slender reed on which to
base a life-or-death statutory construction.

B. THE OVER-RELIANCE ON SECTION 1396b(i)(1)
The courts' interpretations of § 1396b(i)(1) are so contradictory because they rest on an incorrect assumption that the
transplant funding provision provides the key to determining
whether transplants are mandatory or discretionary. All of the
courts attempt to extract the implications for coverage from a
provision that provides funding standards. This results in textual inconsistency and strained examinations of a legislative
history that, unsurprisingly, better indicates Congress's intent
on funding standards than on the scope of Medicaid coverage. It
is no wonder, then, that the Ninth Circuit can state that organ
transplants are optional "because they are not among the listed
required services" 138 even as the Fourth Circuit declares that
"[wihen Congress has intended to make provision of a Medicaid
service optional.., it has listed that service [with the described
optional service categories]." 13 9 The irony with these assertions
is that neither mandatory nor optional services are listed in
§ 1396b, where the transplant provision appears, but in
§ 1396d. 140 For the question of whether transplants are
mandatory or optional, § 1396b(i)(1) is simply a red herring.
The best reading of § 1396b(i)(1) is that is that the provision
does not say anything at all about the scope of mandated coverage or about state discretion. To construe the various provisions
138. Dexter v. Kirsclmer, 972 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir.), modified, 984 F.2d
979 (9th Cir. 1992).

139. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1993).
140. See supra notes 38, 41 (listing mandatory and optional service

categories).
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of § 1396b(i) as "merely laying out additional standards the
states must meet to receive federal funds" 14 1 is to do nothing
more than read the section exactly as the title of § 1396 would
indicate: "Payment to States." 142 In this light, the absence of
persuasive legislative history makes complete sense. Section
1396b(i)(1) does not affirm or deny any substantive entitlement
of beneficiaries to a certain service, but merely clarifies the criteria for federal payment for transplants. Members of Congress in
1985 may have had opinions about practice or policy on funding
of transplants, but they probably did not believe that they were
significantly changing the scope of mandated coverage by enacting the transplant provision. Indeed, the only intent legislators
expressed was not to settle the issue of discretion, but to insure
that states followed certain standards that insured equitable
treatment of recipients and high quality of care. In enacting
§ 1396b(i)(1), Congress only changed the law on payment to
states, not on the scope of coverage.

C. DEFINING THE TAXONOMIC TASK:

CATEGORIZING
TRANSPLANTS AS MANDATORY OR OPTIONAL

There is no reason to think that § 1396b(i)(1) must provide
the key to the issue of discretion. As noted previously, Title XIX
specifically characterizes few medical services as either
mandatory or optional; rather, the statute defines scope of coverage categorically. 143 Medically necessary transplant procedures, like other surgical procedures, would probably be
mandatory services under Title XIX as "inpatient hospital services"' 4 4 or "physician's services"' 45 were it not for the interpretive wild goose chase that § 1396b(i)(1) has engendered. Indeed,
the state of Virginia in Pereiraconceded that transplant procedures would ordinarily be mandatory services unless
§ 1396b(i)(1) granted discretion. 1 46 On the other hand, the reluctance of the courts in Dexter and Ellis to open the door to
broad mandatory coverage of transplants is perfectly under141. Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1988).

143. See supra note 40 (discussing gastric ulcer example).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) (1988).
145. Id. § 1396d(a)(5)(A).
146. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 724 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The
Commonwealth concedes that absent exception in the Act, Pereira's heart
transplant would be covered as one of those [mandatory] services.").
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relatively new and
standable: many transplant procedures are
47
all transplant procedures are expensive.'
In reaching their opposite conclusions, the courts were
clearly concerned with the broader implications of their interpretive choices: for the Fourth Circuit in Pereira,the cost to recipients of making all transplants optional was too much to
bear; for the Eighth Circuit in Ellis and Ninth Circuit in Dexter,
the cost to states of providing all medically necessary transplants was unreasonable. With these competing concerns in
mind, the courts cast the issue for decision in broad terms:
Transplants, as a generic category, are either mandatory (and
therefore states must pay for all needed procedures) or they are
optional (and therefore states may always chose to deny life-saving medical treatment).
The courts, however, did not face plaintiffs seeking generic
transplants. They dealt instead with plaintiffs seeking specific
procedures: heart transplants, liver transplants, liver-bowel
transplants, pancreas transplants, allogenic bone marrow transplants. A generic approach, therefore, creates two difficulties.
First, it produces broad, sweeping holdings that turn the scope
of mandated transplant coverage into an all-or-nothing dilemma. On the one hand, states have complete discretion under
Ellis and Dexter to deny life-saving health care to recipients
without reference to individual medical need or the level of professional acceptance of particular procedures. On the other
hand, Pereira(and perhaps Pittman) possibly compel states to
provide all requested transplants, without reference to cost-effectiveness, state health care priorities, or even whether the particular procedure has been shown to be safe or effective. Both
lines of decisions leave completely unclear the limits of state discretion and recipient entitlement. If a state has initial discretion to refuse to fund any transplants under Title XIX, but
chooses to fund some transplants, the question of the degree to
which state distinctions or criteria for transplant funding are
subject to judicial examination remains unanswered. The
Eighth Circuit's decision following Ellis in Meusberger v.
Palmeri 48 sharply illustrates this problem: the panel was divided on the extent to which the court could review the state's
decision to fund some pancreas transplants but deny others. 14 9
147. See supra note 8 (citing costs of some transplant procedures).
148. 900 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1990).
149. See supra note 81 (discussing Meusberger);see also Miller by Miller v.
Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1320-22 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's hold-
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Conversely, the Fourth Circuit's broad holding that states lack
discretion leaves unanswered the extent to which states may
permissibly set restrictions on transplant funding. 150
These difficulties reveal what the courts in both lines of
cases failed to address: not all transplant procedures are created equal. It may be perfectly understandable for a state to
exclude coverage of allogenic bone marrow transplant surgery;
such surgery is not only extremely costly but also new, controversial among medical professionals, and without much history
of testing.15 ' It is less understandable, unless the sole criterion
for decision is absolute cost, to exclude heart transplant proce52
dures, which have been done for more than twenty-five years,
or cornea transplants, which present patients with relatively little risk. 153 Ellis ironically reflects this confusion of the generic
with the specific. The Eighth Circuit asserted that transplants,
as a generic category, are discretionary because "[slurely Congress did not intend to require the states to provide funds for
exotic surgeries which.., have a small chance of success and
carry an enormous price tag"1 5 4 only two pages after noting that
a liver transplant, the specific procedure without which Brandy
Ellis would die, would mean "a 90% chance to live an active and
normal life for the next five years." 5 5
This ironic tension in Ellis arises from the same interpretive difficulties that forced the Fourth Circuit in Pereirato limit
inexplicably its holding to children, after finding that Title XIX
does not grant states discretion for transplant coverage choices
for any Medicaid recipients.' 5 6 Both courts must deal with an
ing that because state had complete discretion in funding transplants, the
state's criteria for funding certain transplants are unreviewable).

150. The court's confusing limitation of its holding to children, even though
the court declined to rely expressly on the EPSDT provisions, further muddies
the picture. See supranote 96 (discussing the tension between the court's broad
reasoning and apparently narrow holding).
151. Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113, 1119-20 (9th Cir.), modified, 984
F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1992).
152.

LES

PLANTATION

GUTKiND, MANY SLEEPLESS NIGH'Ts: THE WORLD OF ORGAN TRANS-

31-41 (1988).

153. Ironically, the district court in Ellis recognized precisely this fact, even
as it denied funding: "Clearly there are organ transplants and there are organ
transplants. A corneal transplant, for instance, deals with a non-life threaten-

ing situation and is otherwise in an obviously different category than liver
transplants." Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 713 F. Supp. 292, 296 (E.D. Ark.), vacated, 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988).
154. Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988).
155. Id. at 53.
156. See supra note 96 (discussing the holding in Pereira).
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inscrutable statutory provision, a scanty and contradictory legislative history, and a concern that they find the "right answer"
for organ transplants as a generic category, with the consequence of either mandating al needed transplants or subjecting
recipients to complete state discretion.
IV. AN EVOLUTIVE VIEW OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM
The failure of the circuits in Ellis, Dexter, and Pereira to
marshall convincing support for their broad holdings stems from
a more fundamental interpretive deficiency: the lack of adequate examination of the multiple, evolving, and sometimes contradictory goals and structure of Medicaid. The rapid changes
in the statute, the program, the health care industry, and medical technology demand a dynamic interpretive approach 15 7 that
takes into account the historical development of Medicaid and
the current medical, legal, and political context in which Medicaid provides health care.
A.

STATUTORY AND PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES IN MEDICAID

The futility of reaching broad holdings on states' obligations
to provide transplants through a constrained analysis of text
and legislative history of § 1396b(i)(1) is not only fundamentally
misguided; the substantial and continual changes in the Medicaid statute and the development of the program virtually
dooms such an approach even on its own terms.
The Medicaid program and Title XIX have not merely
evolved-they have mutated. Only thirty years old, Title XIX
has become ever more complex, if not impenetrable, 158 by virtue
157. For discussions of models of dynamic statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAmic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (describing

models and their theoretical bases); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. Rxv. 20 (1988) (arguing in favor of dynamic
interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987) (arguing that dynamic interpretation is descriptively as
well as normatively superior to static interpretation); William N. Eskridge,
Gadamer/StatutoryInterpretation,90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990) (discussing
relevance of extra-legal theorists of textual interpretation). According to Eskridge, dynamic statutory interpretation is characterized by a primary textual
analysis, examination of original legislative expectations and compromises, and
an awareness of the "subsequent evolution of the statute and its present context, especially the ways in which the societal and legal environment of the
statute has materially changed over time." Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,supra, at 1483.
158. See supra note 22 (discussing frustrated judicial reaction to Title XIX).
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of constant amendment. 15 9 New provisions such as § 1396b(i)(1)
have, by a process of accretion, attached to Title XIX like barnacles. The program itself has both exploded in size since 1965
and has increasingly varied from state to state. 160 Because of
the frequent changes in the program, HCFA often cannot promulgate timely1 and comprehensive implementing regulations
16
and policies.
Because of this mutation in the statute and the operation of
the program, it is virtually impossible to settle disputed questions by easy reference to statutory text or legislative history.
This is particularly problematic in the transplant cases and similar scope-of-coverage cases, where vague, laudatory, yet critical
terms such as "best interests of the recipients," 6 2 "sufficient in
amount, duration, and scope,"' 63 or "similarly situated" 6 4 exist
side by side with intricate and arcane technical provisions on
eligibility 165 and federal payment to states.' 6 6 Courts attempting to divine the line between state discretion and recipient enti67
tlement indeed risk "get[ting] lost in the Medicaid maze."'
This is not to suggest that text or legislative history will not
sometimes give clear answers in scope-of-coverage issues in the
Medicaid program. 68 As the Fourth Circuit recognized in Pereira, had the language of the Title XIX transplant fimding provision been clear, the court's interpretive role would have been
narrow. 16 9 Given the complexity and evolution of the language
of Title XX and the rapid change in the Medicaid program itself, however, courts can rarely make the text speak consistently
and clearly on scope-of-coverage issues.
159. See generally Kinney, supra note 13 (describing complication of relationship between federal and state authorities resulting from constant amendment of Title XIX).
160. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing growth in
Medicaid spending); supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing disparity in eligibility and coverage policies).
161. Kinney, supra note 13, at 899-901.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1988).
163. Id. § 1396b(i); 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1993).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(1)(A) (1988).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
167. Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 282 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
168. Proponents of dynamic interpretive approaches stress that statutory
text must remain an anchor for interpretation. "The statutory text... is the
formal focus of interpretation and a constraint on the range of interpretive options." Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,supra note 157, at 1483.
169. Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1993).
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B. THE CoNTExr AND VALuEs OF MEDICAID
Because Title XIX is essentially silent on the scope of coverage for organ transplants, one could make the fall-back argument, suggested previously, that because they are not
specifically listed as an optional service, transplants are a
mandatory inpatient hospital service under Title XMX.1 70 On the
other hand, one could reverse the assumption by concluding that
Title XIX includes a limited set of mandatory services, and that
transplant decisions are appropriately a matter of state discretion because the statute does not expressly mandate them.1 7 1
Because the statute's text compels neither choice, courts must
make a decision by additional reference to the values and goals
the Medicaid program expresses and the societal context in
which it operates. 17 2 By focusing on the indeterminate provisions of § 1396b(i)(1), however, the courts have failed to weigh
adequately the various societal and political expectations and
values bound up in the program.
For example, while the courts in Ellis and Dexter make
much of the minimal language of the legislative history of
§ 1396b(i)(1),' 73 they ignore the larger context of Congress's
amendments to Title XIX as a whole in 1985. Beginning in
170. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (citing the Seventh Circuit's
use of this argument in Pereira).
171. In Meusbergerv. Palmer,the Eighth Circuit appeared to come close to
making this assumption: "States have some discretion in determining which
medical services to cover under their Medicaid program. Other medical services, such as inpatient and outpatient hospital services, laboratory and X-ray
services, skilled nursing facility services, and physician services must be provided." 900 F.2d 1280, 1282 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Dexter v. Kirschner, 972
F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir.) (quoting and agreeing with the language from Meusberger), modified, 984 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1992).
172. A court can duck this difficult question, however, by virtue of another
method. See, e.g., Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993)
(avoiding a decision on the scope of state discretion by remanding for a determination whether a particular transplant is experimental); Todd by Todd v. Sorrell, 841 F.2d 87, 90 (4th Cir. 1988) (avoiding a decision on the scope of state
discretion by holding that the Medicaid recipient "substantially complied" with
state criteria for a liver transplant).
As noted below, even though Miller does indeed duck the precise question
disputed in Ellis, Dexter, and Pereira,the court's course in that case is a model
of the decisional process on organ transplant coverage disputes suggested by
this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 212-213 (discussing the model of
review suggested by Miller).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 129-133 (discussing courts' analyses of the legislative history of the transplant provision).
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1984, Congress had begun to expand Medicaid coverage.1 74 In
the COBRA amendments of 1985,175 Congress not only enacted
§ 1396b(i)(1), but also expanded the number of Medicaid services
offered; these additional services included hospice care, case
management services, and ventilator care for institutionalized
children. 17 6
During this period, Congress also expanded eligibility. In
1984, Congress expanded "categorically needy" eligibility, thus
placing substantial new requirements on states to extend Medicaid coverage to persons previously not covered.1 7 7 In 1987,
when § 1396b(i)(1) was amended, Congress expanded the eligibility criteria for the "optionally categorically needy,"178 expanded required coverage for certain poor children, and took
steps to ensure the quality of care in Medicaid-funded nursing
homes.179

Finally, in the mid-1980s, Congress, reacting to public concern about the shortage of donor organs and the cost to patients
of transplant procedures, enacted several bills that facilitated
organ transplants. 180 The National Organ Transplant Act of
174. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 35-37 (summarizing seven pieces of legislation in the 1980s that expanded Medicaid coverage,
allowing, among others, additional higher income people to qualify); Kinney,
supra note 13, at 875-81 (citing the Democrat-dominated Senate in 1986, the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1985, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 as contributing to
Medicaid's coverage expansion, especially for pregnant women and children).
175. Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82, 151-222 (1986) (amended 1992).
176. Kinney, supra note 13, at 877. These additions to Title XIX were optional services that states could choose to provide. Id. Unlike the transplant
provision, however, Congress placed these services in § 1396d among the other
defined service categories. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(18)-(20) (1988). This further
supports a conclusion that in enacting the transplant provision, Congress did
not create a new optional service category; had it done so, it would have included transplants in § 1396d, as it did for the truly new service categories it
created in 1985. See supra text accompanying notes 138-140 (discussing the
significance of the location of the transplant provision in Title XIX).
177. MEDICAm SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 35-37; Kinney, supra note 13,
at 876.
178. See supranote 23 (describing "mandatory categorically needy" and "optionally categorically needy" elgibility subgroups).
179. Congress made these changes in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987). MEDICAID SOURCE
BooK, supra note 5, at 36; Kinney, supra note 13, at 878-79. These amendments produced the legislative history that the courts in Ellis and Dexter considered crucial. See supra text accompanying notes 129-133 (discussing these
courts' use of the legislative history).
180. See generally Richard A. Rettig, The Politicsof Organ Transplantation:
A Parableof Our Time, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY. ISSUES AND PROS-
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1984 established a national data base on donor organ availability, and provided grants and established standards for organ
procurement agencies to facilitate effective and equitable allocation of donor organs.1 8 1 In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1986 (OBRA 1986), the 99th Congress (which also enacted
§ 1396b(i)(1)) extended Medicare coverage to pay for innovative
drug therapy to facilitate transplant procedures.1 8 2 OBRA 1986
also required hospitals receiving federal Medicare funds to encourage organ donation and to follow regulations for organ procurement.1 8 3 The Organ Transplant Amendments of 1988
reauthorized portions of the 1984 National Organ Transplant
Act and established block grants to states for immunosuppres1 84
sive drugs.
The prevailing mood in Congress in the mid-1980s was of
Medicaid expansion, in terms of eligibility, coverage, and protection of recipients. There was also a clear concern with the ability of needy individuals to obtain and pay for organ transplant
procedures. In this context, the scant legislative history and indeterminate text cited in Ellis and Dexter to allow unilateral,
discretionary restriction of transplant coverage, loses much of
whatever interpretive weight it ever had. Yet this contextual
analysis is completely absent in all of the circuit court transplant cases.
On the other hand, neither the prevailing mood nor even the
specific intent of Congress in 1985 necessarily reflects the current social and political landscape, and it would be equally unfortunate to dismiss the current contextual factors that suggest
courts should be hesitant to impose broad mandates on states to
provide all transplants that recipients request. The social idealism that produced both Medicaid and Medicare in 1965185 has
buckled in large measure to the fiscal realities of the enormous
191, 199-207 (James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989) (describing the events preceding the enactment of the National Organ Transplant Act
of 1984).
181. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339, 2339-40 (1984) (amended 1986).
182. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9335(c), 100 Stat. 1874, 2030 (1986).
183. Id. § 9318, 100 Stat. at 2009.
184. Pub. L. No. 100-607, §§ 401-408, 102 Stat. 3114, 3114-20 (1988)
(amended 1989).
185. For a discussion of the social and political context of the creation of
Medicaid and Medicare during the early 1960s, see ROBERT STEVENS & ROsEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY or MEDIcAID 1954 (1974).
PECTS
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expansion in the number of beneficiaries, 8 6 the increasing cost
of health care,' 8 7 and the concomitant fiscal burden that Medicaid places on state governments.-8 8 These burdens have increasingly led to calls for Medicaid's curtailment or
restructuring. 8 9 As is becoming increasingly clear, issues of
cost are also issues of ethics; it is too facile to mandate transplants broadly and boldly as a generic category of services when
health care dollars are undeniably scarce, and when the easiest
way for states to reduce Medicaid costs is to exercise their undeniable discretion to cut the rolls of medically needy recipients or
the array of optional, but nonetheless needed, services. 1 90
The courts in the cases discussed also do not clearly come to
grips with the evolutive nature of medical technology. 19 1 Pereira
unrealistically opens the door to presumptive public funding of
all transplant procedures, failing to acknowledge that new technologies undergo an initial period of uncertainty and transition
186. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 840-41; Robert N. Swidler, Medical Innovations and Ethics: A State Government Perspective, 57 ALB. L. REv. 655, 661-62
(1994).

187. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the growth of
health care costs).
188. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (describing the fiscal burdens of Medicaid on states).
189. See, e.g., Joseph F. Sullivan, New Jersey Plans to Cut Payments for
Medicaid 20%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1994, at Al (reporting New Jersey's plan
for deep cuts in hospital reimbursements under the state's Medicaid plan).
190. As one commentator noted:
Cost-effectiveness is, and must be, a legitimate consideration in
the publicly financed sector of the health care system. States must operate within a budget: there are limits to the tax and other revenues
they can access, and consequently there are limits to what they can
spend. If a State simply funds all expensive medical procedures ordered by physicians without any regard to cost-effectiveness, it does
not merely violate some abstract responsibility to taxpayers in general,
it threatens the availability of resources for others who may need them
more.
Swidler, supra note 186, at 662-63 (footnotes omitted); see also Angela R.
Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L. REv. 795, 795-800
(1994) (discussing insurance companies' reluctance to fund innovative, experimental, but potentially life-saving treatment for desperately ill patients). For a
discussion of the ethical issues in allocation of scarce resources for desired
goods such as medical care, see CALABRxsI & BOsBrr, supra note 7.
191. The development and use of new medical technology is also part and
parcel of the growth in health care costs. See Swidler, supra note 186, at 661 &
n.19 (1994) (discussing the role of technological innovation in driving up health
care costs). On the other hand, new technology accounts for only a small part of
cost increases in the Medicaid program; general price inflation and specific
health care inflation represent most of the growth in Medicaid spending. MEDICAID TRENDS AND OPTIONS, supra note 17, at 40.
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not only in the funding arena, 92 but also among medical professionals and providers.' 9 3 On the other hand, a categorical position that new technologies, such as certain organ transplants,
should be entirely discretionary tends to freeze artificially the
scope of coverage. Such a frozen and at least arguably inappropriate restrictiveness is stark in cases such as Pereira, where
transplant, had been in
the "new" technology at issue, a 9heart
4
use for more than twenty years.1
Finally, an undeniable contextual factor in the transplant
cases is the compelling human suffering that judges face when
deciding the scope of medical coverage under Medicaid. The
choice for judges is stark: either grant the requested relief, or
allow the state to deny funding for a life-saving transplant in the
name of "cooperative federalism." Weighing the human cost of
denying health care to people who will otherwise die is a justifiable interpretive factor, whether one views Medicaid as a program that represents a redistributive "entitlement to common
goods" 19 5 or because denial implicates norms of justice or fairness that courts should not readily impinge with dubious statutory interpretation. 19 6 Whatever the jurisprudential rationale,
such equitable concerns constitute a subtext in the organ transplant cases, as should be apparent from decisions such as Meusberger v. Palmer'97 and Todd by Todd v. Sorrell,198 where the
192. Private health insurance providers typically restrict reimbursement of
new medical procedures. This has led to equally bitter disputes over the contractual scope of coverage of private health plans. See Saver, supra note 54, at
1100-04.
193. Deborah Mathieu, Introduction,in ORGAN SUBSTrUTION TECHNOLOGY:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC PoLicY IssuEs, supra note 7, at 133, 133-35.
194. GuTKND, supra note 152, at 32-33. A similar tension is apparent in
Ellis, where the Eighth Circuit simultaneously denied a liver transplant in part
because of a reluctance to force states to pay for "risky and unproven" procedures, yet noted that the particular liver transplant had a 90% chance of prolonging Brandy Ellis's life. See supra note 80 and accompanying text
(discussing this paradox).

195. Rosenblatt, supra note 49, at 797.
196. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARv. L. REV 407 (1989). Sunstein suggests that welfare statutes might be
construed aggressively in order "to insure against irrational or arbitrary deprivations of benefits" and to facilitate "evenhandedness in the distribution of
funds to the poor in a democracy that has committed itself to a 'social safety
net.'" Id. at 474. However one labels or formulates such an interpretive approach, there can be little doubt that most members of our society would feel
substantial unease in denying life-saving organ transplants to dying patients.
197. 900 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (8th Cir. 1990); see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Meusberger and its inconsistencies with Ellis).
198. 841 F.2d 87, 90 (4th Cir. 1988); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the court's opinion).
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courts strained to find justifications for ordering transplant reimbursement. Even in Ellis, which so strongly rejected the argument that Title XIX mandates organ transplant funding,
Judge Arnold frankly acknowledged the powerful concerns at
hand:
The real question in the case is how you weigh all this together. How
do you weigh the chances of prevailing, the injury to the plaintiff and
the injury to the state? And it seems to me that the equities, when you
consider the whole thing and shake it up in a bag, so to speak, and try
to come out with an answer, the answer comes out in favor of granting
the relief. It isn't possible to explain mathematically that result, it's a
matter of judgment.1 99

C. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO TRANSPLANT COVERAGE UNDER
TiTLE XIX

The arguments marshalled by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in finding that § 1396b(i)(1) confers discretion to states on
transplant coverage decisions are unconvincing. They largely
fail to deal with the actual statutory text, rest on meager and
contradictory legislative history, and are not consistent with the
apparent concerns of the Congress that enacted the provision.
The harsh conclusion that states are completely free to deny lifesaving medical procedures to people such as Brandy Ellis and
Sheri Dexter demands more justification than these decisions
20 0
offer.
Courts should presume that specific transplant procedures
sought by Medicaid recipients are mandated as inpatient hospital services under Title XIX. States, however, should be able to
199. Hearing Before the Honorable Richard Arnold at 3, Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. LR-C-88-542), quoted in Ann B. Lever &
Herbert A. Eastman, "Shake it up in a Bag": Strategiesfor RepresentingBeneficiaries in Medicaid Litigation, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 863, 863-64 (1991). Similarly, in Todd by Todd v. Sorrell, the Third Circuit directly weighed the
competing interests in reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction ordering
the state of Virginia to pay for a liver transplant for four-year-old Michelle
Todd: "Undoubtedly the harm to the plaintiff would have been enormous, indeed fatal, were the injunction denied, and the harm to the Commonwealth if
granted, while it may not have been negligible, was measured only in money
and was inconsequential by comparison." 841 F.2d at 88. Such considerations
may also undergird the Fourth Circuit's rather cryptic allusion to "significant
jurisprudential considerations" in Pereira by Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d
723, 727 (4th Cir. 1993). See supra text accompanying note 103 (quoting the
final paragraph of the court's opinion in Pereira).
200. It is especially ironic that while the Eighth Circuit has held that states
have complete discretion to choose not to cover any medically necessary organ
transplants, it has also held that states must cover medically necessary sex reassignment surgery. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980).
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rebut this presumption by a showing that the state has reasonably determined that the particular procedure is currently experimental according to the definition of "experimental" that
HCFA has formulated and courts already follow. 20 1
Construing Title XIX to favor coverage of transplants is consistent with § 1396b(i)(1), which even the Eighth Circuit in Ellis
conceded could be read merely as a set of conditions for federal
reimbursement, rather than as a grant of state discretion. 20 2
Construing the provision to favor coverage is also in line with
judicial practice in interpreting private health care insurance
plans; courts generally treat health insurance plans as contracts
of adhesion, and construe ambiguities in favor of the
20 3
recipient.
Nor should categorizing transplants as within the scope of
mandated coverage under Medicaid pose substantial new burdens for states. Most states already provide reimbursement for
at least some transplants under their Medicaid plans.20 4 The
greatest financial burden to states does not come from providing
relatively infrequent high-technology procedures like transplants, but from the general inflation in the cost of health
care20 5 and the disproportionate share of Medicaid funds going
to high-cost institutional care for elderly and disabled
20 6
persons.
In addition, this construction of Title XIX would not force
states to unreasonably assume the exorbitant costs of new,
risky, and unproven transplant procedures; a state could exclude a particular transplant procedure from funding if the state
reasonably determines that the particular transplant procedure
is "experimental." Under current law, a medical procedure is ex201. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing HCFA policy on
experimental treatment and cases that have dealt with this issue).
202. See supra text accompanying note 76 (quoting the Ellis courts discussion of the transplant provision).
203. See Saver, supra note 54, at 1100 & nn.24-26 (discussing courts' treatment of scope-of-coverage issues in private insurance plans).
204. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing state coverage of transplant procedures).
205. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing costs to
states of Medicaid program). There is anecdotal evidence that mandatory coverage does not necessarily increase costs dramatically. After New York was
enjoined from denying coverage for Clozapine, a new anti-psychotic medication
that it had excluded because of the drug's exorbitant cost, the state turned next
to pressure Clozapine's manufacturer, and succeeded in forcing a dramatic reduction in the drug's price. Swidler, supra note 186, at 666-76.
206. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionate cost of long-term institutional care).
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perimental and excluded from coverage if the medical community has not generally accepted the procedure, if it is rarely
used, novel, or relatively unknown, and if evidence has not established the procedure's safety and effectiveness. 20 7 Treating
transplants in this manner under Title XIX does nothing more
than put them on the same level as other new medical technologies, giving states the same discretion with regard to "experimental" transplants as they currently have with experimental
procedures generally.
A state's decision to exclude a certain procedure because it
is "experimental" should be subject to judicial review, but with a
rather narrow standard. Courts surely are not in the best position, from a standpoint of either legitimacy or capacity, to pronounce when new technologies have become part of the
mainstream of medical practice. 20 8 The Seventh Circuit's remand and articulated scope of review in Miller by Miller v.
Whitburn illustrates this suggested model of review.2 0 9 In
Miller, the court recognized that "different definitions of 'experimental' may be necessary depending upon ... the treatment
under review,"2 10 but also that "'experimental' ... is an 'objective benchmark' against which... [state decisions] may be measured."2 11 States might use a number of factors in determining
12 In
whether a particular kind of transplant is experimental.2
207. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing
Enclosure No. 2 to Intermediary Letters Nos. 77-4 & 77-5, [1976 Transfer
Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 28,152).
208. Saver, supra note 54, at 1117-20 (discussing the institutional incapacity of courts in acting as ultimate adjudicators of medical effectiveness).
209.

10 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993); see also supra note 81 and ac-

210.

Id. at 1320.

companying text (discussing Miller).

211. Id. (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 519 (1990)).
212. The court in Miller suggested factors such as patient mortality, frequency and success of use, the reputation and record of the doctors or facilities
that provide the procedure, the prognosis of patients who have had the procedure, and the history of technology development in related procedures. Id. at
1320 n.11 (citing Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and
Medical Technology: A Critiqueof Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 778,
785 (1986)). Other factors that a state might reasonably use include whether
the Food and Drug Administration has approved the procedure, whether other
public programs (such as Medicare) fund the procedure, whether private insurance payers generally fund the procedure, and whether professional organizations have formally accepted the procedure. Saver, supra note 54, at 1122-24.
Under such an approach, Iowa's decision not to fund pancreas transplants at
issue in Meusberger v. Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280, 1282 & nn.3-5 (8th Cir. 1990),
might well be valid, because the state based its determination on HCFA's determination that pancreas transplants were investigational, and therefore were
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Miller, the state had in fact developed criteria for excluding procedures as "experimental."2 13 The court remanded for a determination of the narrow issue of whether the state had
"reasonably applied" its definition to the particular transplant in
had "significant discretion" in
issue, stressing that the state
2 14
making such determinations.
Such an approach strikes a balance between the "all or
nothing" choices of either categorical mandate or utter state discretion. In this approach, the states retain the authority and
obligation to place reasonable limitations on procedures that are
not "medically necessary" because they are too risky, ineffective,
or unproven. A deferential standard of review would allow
states to make reasonable funding decisions and set reasonable
criteria based on a variety of factors, including cost-effectiveness. At the same time, a presumption of coverage would encourage states to develop written standards for transplants in
accordance with § 1396b(i)(1) and would prevent arbitrary denials of service and blanket, categorical decisions not to fund some
or all transplants.
This suggested interpretive approach urges both a substantive coverage policy and a decisional process. This approach also
encourages sensibility: states would fund established, accepted,
and relatively low-risk transplants while retaining discretion in
funding unproven procedures. Natalia Pereira would receive
her new heart; Arizona, however, might still justifiably deny
Sheri Dexter her allogenic bone marrow transplant, if such a denial is in fact reasonable. 2 15 Also implicit in this approach is the
not funded under the Medicare program. Id.; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Meusberger).
213. The state's criteria were:
(1) The current and historical judgment of the medical community as
evidenced by medical research, studies, journals or treatises;
(2) The extent to which Medicare and private health insurers recognize and provide coverage for the service;
(3) The current judgment of experts and specialists in the medical specialty area [or areas] in which the service is applicable or used ....
Miller, 10 F.3d at 1320 (citing Wis. ADmiN. CODE § HSS 107.035(2) (Sept.
1991)).
214. Id. at 1321.
215. Sheri Dexter's tragedy ironically illustrates the intersection of funding
decisions with technological advances. The allogenic bone marrow transplant
which Dexter needed was developed as an alternative to autologous bone marrow transplants (which were funded under the state plan), but which in the
past have been as fiercely controversial as allogenic transplants. See supra note
83 and accompanying text (discussing autologous and allogenic marrow transplants). Recently, some hospitals have performed umbilical blood transplants,
a new procedure that may in its turn be an alternative to allogenic bone marrow
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possibility that states may exclude certain transplants, but lose
that discretion as particular procedures become more accepted
and documented.
The lack of a bright line interpretive rule and the focus on
specific procedures, rather than the generic category of "transplants," does create the possibility that courts will review certain procedures repeatedly. However, a presumption of
coverage, attention to evolutive issues in technology and policy,
and review of specific procedures encourages a full and honest
weighing of competing concerns, rather than forcing courts into
an essentially futile, text-bound, and interpretive analysis that
produces 6 inconsistent, inflexible, overbroad, and unjust
results. 21
CONCLUSION
The contradictory and confusing conclusions that courts
have reached on the obligations of states to provide organ transplant procedures for Medicaid recipients suggest some of the difficulties courts face in balancing the competing concerns and
values of the Medicaid program. Faced with a statute that borders on incomprehensibility, the courts in these cases have understandably pursued incorrect interpretive approaches and
failed to fully consider the evolutive nature of the statute, the
program, and medical technology. This Note suggests a dynamic, evolutive approach to Medicaid scope-of-coverage issues
transplants. See, e.g., Blood Stem Cells as Alternative to Bone-Marrow Transplants, CANCER REsEARCHER WKLY., Sept. 26, 1994 (discussing the possibility of
transplanting umbilical cord blood stem cells as a cure for cancer); Don Colburn, The Littlest Donor: Umbilical Cord Blood Is a New Source of Marrow,
WASH. Posr, Aug. 2, 1994, at Z10 (reporting a bone marrow transplant from an
infant donor's umbilical cord and placenta); Joan Swirsky, Aid for Cancer Cases
From a New Source: Umbilical Cords, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, § 13LI, at 10
(discussing umbilical cell transplants as a potential cure for leukemia).
216. Courts should not limit such an approach to transplants. New nontransplant technologies continue to appear and move from nonacceptance to acceptance. An example is magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), a powerful diagnostic tool. Prior to 1985, HCFA excluded MRI from Medicare coverage,
labeling it "experimental." After HCFA determined that MRI was commonly
accepted and proven, it began to reimburse Medicare claims for MRI tests.
Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Unfortunately, HCFA recognized MIRs safety and effectiveness after the Food and
Drug Agency had done so. This led to the rather bizarre situation that, for a
time, the federal government would not pay for MRI under Medicare on the
basis that it was not proven to be safe and effective, even though the federal
agency responsible for insuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
had determined MRI to be so. Id.
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that places the burden on states reasonably to justify denial of
funding for new technologies and treatments, but that also recognizes that questions of cost-effectiveness and professional acceptance are best determined within the medical community
and not in the courts. Such an approach acknowledges the complexities of Title XIX and the "cooperative federalism" nature of
Medicaid. Ultimately, this approach ensures that states exercise discretion to develop reasonable funding criteria that reflect
sound medical practice and clearly articulated public policies,
when deciding the scope of coverage for organ transplants under
the Medicaid program.

